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Among the most popular ways to watch television over the Internet is a Web
site called Hulu, a joint venture among NBC, ABC, Fox, and others. Over 40
million users watch Hulu every month.2 Another popular way is Miro, an open
source technology offered by a nonprofit group in Boston, Massachusetts,
called the Participatory Culture Foundation. Miro permits anyone to broadcast
his or her own "channel" online in high-definition, and now includes thousands
of channels, from PBS and the Onion News Network to the channels of any
individual creator.' Hundreds of thousands of Americans can adopt the user-
friendly interface of software like Boxee or Plex App to program a remote con-
trol and watch, on their biggest living room television screens, Internet content
in high-definition through Hulu and Miro.4
In February 2009, however, in perhaps the most famous incident exemplify-
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ing the clash between online television and traditional distribution, Hulu
blocked the Boxee browser from accessing Hulu's content offerings.' That is,
Hulu made itself unavailable to the hundreds of thousands of Boxee users by
changing its code so that Boxee could not integrate Hulu offerings. In an
apologetic blog post, Hulu's CEO explained that pressure from its content part-
ners-which include NBC, Fox, and Disney-forced Hulu's executives to stop
supporting Boxee.6 Despite an outcry from Hulu users,7 Hulu went on to block
Boxee from Hulu's public RSS feed as well.' Hulu's terms of service for its
desktop software now forbid using the software with any device other than a
personal computer-including television screens.9
The response of Hulu's content partners provides a window into the thinking
of incumbent providers in the television industry. Many believe that the con-
tent partners were responding to cable operators, satellite companies, and
phone companies-all of which are called, in the language of attorneys at the
Federal Communications Commission ("FCC" or "Commission"), multichan-
nel video programming distributors ("MVPDs"). ° Indeed, Hulu may have been
responding to the content partner then likely negotiating for purchase by an
MVPD-NBC, which was negotiating with Comcast." Incumbent MVPDs,
5 Chris Foresman, Hulu Puts the Kibosh on Streaming Boxee Integration, ARS TECH-
NICA, Feb. 19, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/media/news/2009/02/hulu-puts-the-kibosh-on-
streaming-boxee-integration.ars.
6 See Posting of Jason Kilar, Doing Hard Things, to Hulu Blog,
http://blog.hulu.com/2009/02/18/doing-hard-things/ (Feb. 18, 2009).
7 See id. (including reader comments decrying Hulu's dropping of Boxee service).
8 Posting of Brad Stone, Boxee Brings Hulu Back to Its Service, to N.Y. TIMES BITS
BLOG, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/06/sidestepping-objections-boxee-brings-hulu-
back-to-its-service/ (Mar. 6, 2009, 12:42 EST); Posting of Brad Stone, Hulu Evades Boxee's
Embrace (Again), to N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG,
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/03/06/hulu-evades-boxees-embrace-again/ (Mar. 6,
2009, 17:34 EST).
9 Hulu - Labs: Hulu Desktop, http://www.hulu.com/labs/hulu-desktop (click download
for Windows, and then begin installation process. Before the installation begins, the user
must agree to the Hulu End User License Agreement, Terms of Use and Privacy Policy)
(last visited March 23, 2010). The site states,
You may not download, install or use the Hulu Software on any device other than a
Personal Computer including without limitation digital media receiver devices (such as
Apple TV), mobile devices (such as a cell phone device, mobile handheld device or a
PDA), network devices or CE devices (collectively 'Prohibited Devices'). You may not
use any hardware, software or service other than the Hulu Software to stream, re-
encode, project or transmit Hulu Content.
Id.
10 See HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 752 (25th ed. 2009).
1 Comcast and General Electric, the parent company of NBC Universal, announced in
December 2009 that Comcast would take a fifty-one percent ownership stake in NBC Uni-
versal. Press Release, Comcast, Comcast and GE to Create Leading Entertainment Company
(Dec. 3, 2009), available at
http://www.comcast.com/nbcutransaction/pdfs/Press%20ReleaseFinal_1 2.3.09.pdf.
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from Comcast to Verizon, realize that the Internet could upend the traditional
television market. Today, consumers usually have a choice of very few
MVPDs-no more than one local cable operator (like Comcast or Time War-
ner Cable), a satellite operator (like DirecTV), and a local phone company
(like Verizon or AT&T, in at best forty percent of the nation). 2 Because of the
high costs of laying cable or phone lines or launching satellites, new entry into
the MVPD market through these means is highly unlikely. 3 As a result, the
current market structure provides limited competition among MVPDs, with no
additional competition on the horizon.
This uncompetitive market structure provides MVPDs with the usual fruits
of limited competition: supracompetitive profits and little need to innovate or
respond rapidly and decisively to consumer demands. The traditional industry
agreements confer a cut of the MVPDs' supracompetitive profits on program-
mers powerful enough to negotiate a cut, such as Time Warner (owner of
CNN, TBS, and others) and NBC (owner of Bravo, MSNBC, NBC network,
and others, which is now merging with the MVPD, Comcast). As a result, the
incumbent MVPDs and the powerful incumbent programmers are quite happy
with the existing uncompetitive MVPD market structure. The only losers are
the rest of us--consumers stuck with limited competition, every-increasing
prices, and fewer choices.
Congress and the FCC have attempted for years to marginally increase com-
petition in the MVPD market, 4 generally failing on every front. The incumbent
MVPDs understand, however, that the Internet could enable the same kind of
disruptive competition in the MVPD market that it has enabled in other mar-
kets, from book sales to travel. 5 It could enable "virtual cable companies" to
assemble packages of content online to compete with the MVPDs. It could also
enable programmers to distribute films and movies (known, in FCC-speak, as
"video") directly to consumers, without going through MVPDs, enabling pro-
grammers themselves to act as MVPDs. Thus, ABC.com, or Hulu.com, could
12 See infra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
13 See JONATHAN E. NUECHTERLEIN & PHILIP J. WEISER, DIGITAL CROSSROADS: AMERI-
CAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY IN THE INTERNET AGE 362 (2005). These overwhelming
economies of scale are understood as one of the biggest challenges to competition in any
network industry. Id. at 10-16.
14 See, e.g., In re Implementation of Section 621(a)(1) of the Cable Communications
Policy Act of 1984 as amended by the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competi-
tion Act of 1992, Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22
F.C.C.R. 5101, I-5 (2006) [hereinafter Section 621 NPRM]; Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 7, 106 Stat. 1460, 1483
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 541).
15 See Tim Arango, Cable TV's Big Goal: Web Profits, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2009, at
B 1; Max Frankel, Memoir ofa Memoirist, N.Y. TIMES MAG., June 27, 1999, at 21; HARRELL
ASSOCIATES, THE INTERNET TRAVEL INDUSTRY, WHAT CONSUMERS SHOULD EXPECT AND
NEED TO KNOW, AND OPTIONS FOR A BETTER MARKETPLACE 26 (2002).
20101
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
compete directly with MVPD sites like Comcast.com. The Internet could also
spur competition among existing MVPDs.
Indeed, the Internet has the potential to unleash some of the fiercest com-
petitors to the traditional MVPDs-other traditional MVPDs. Through the In-
temet, cable operators and phone carriers could compete "out of market";
though Cox or Comcast generally are the only cable operator in a given com-
munity-and therefore do not compete with one another-the Internet could
change that. Uncoupling the network from the service, the Internet enables a
"Comcast Online TV" and a "Cox Online TV" to compete head-to-head na-
tionally against an AT&T or Verizon Online TV. Just as you can now reach
any radio station or newspaper in the nation, competing for your business and
attention online through different packages of news stories and diverse songs,
you could choose among packages of television and movie content.
In addition to the incumbent MVPDs competing online, consumers could
also choose among dozens of online, virtual MVPDs. For example, Apple is
attempting to offer a monthly subscription service to supplement its iTunes
offering on AppleTV devices that connect to televisions; Netflix offers shows
and movies online to subscribers; companies like Vuze and Joost had at-
tempted to create virtual MVPDs; Amazon offers a video on demand service;
Roku offers a multichannel service of independent channels through an inex-
pensive end user device (made by Roku)."6 While these services are still nas-
cent and often perceived as complements to MVPDs rather than competitors,
these new services could quickly become legitimate competitors to pay televi-
sion. With such competition-a consumer "dream" 17-consumers could watch
their choice of television shows or films, on demand or on schedule, at com-
petitive prices, on their own schedule, through preferred interfaces, and on a
preferred screen-laptop, handheld, or wall-mounted television.
The incumbents do not like this picture. They benefit from the current con-
centrated market larding them with high profits while they fail to compete or
innovate. They have long feared some users would "cut the cord" on pay-
television by canceling their MVPD subscription, deciding, instead to choose a
potentially competitive "virtual MVPD" providing video content through the
Internet. 8 Many programmers-including both broadcast programmers and
non-broadcast programmers-have increasingly begun to circle the wagons
with incumbent MVPDs, concluding that they too are better off with a cut of
the MVPDs' supra-competitive profits than with the potential wild-west com-
petition enabled by the Internet.
16 See Ammori, supra note 4.
17 Daniel Roth, Netflix Inside, See Ya, Cable, WIRED, Oct. 2009, at 120, 124 ("The
dream of routing around cable companies just may be in sight.").
'8 See, e.g., infra note 146 and accompanying text.
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As a result, the incumbent MVPDs and programmers have engaged in a se-
ries of practices to undermine the competitive threat of online video. This pa-
per will focus on copyright-based, content-lock-out tactics. Other tactics have
received considerable attention. Some incumbents, like cable operators, have
used their control of Internet access to block or limit online television by vio-
lating network neutrality; 9 some have announced overage charges based on
Internet capacity used by a consumer, in ways apparently targeted directly at
online television to ensure users keep their cable subscriptions as well;" many
have crippled consumers' ability to use end-user devices, like cable set-top
boxes, to access online television in an interface that can combine MVPD pro-
grams.2
The content-lock-out strategies are even simpler. The incumbents make sure
that the most popular programming that consumers would like are not available
conveniently online. People will not watch television online if there is nothing
online they want to watch. Rather than block competing technologies in the
network (which the network neutrality rule proposed by the FCC would clearly
prohibit),22 MVPDs can simply starve their competitors of popular shows,
movies, and channels. To keep this content off the Internet, the MVPDs (nota-
bly the cable operators, like Time Warner Cable and Comcast) are pressuring
incumbent programmers (such as Viacom, which owns Comedy Central) not to
put their content online--on programmers' own sites or through third-party
distributors like Vuze or Apple.23 In addition-as the Boxee-Hulu incident
highlights-MVPDs want to keep online television off the living room televi-
sion screen, even if it (unfortunately for incumbents) ends up on computer lap-
19 See In re Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast
Corporation for Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications; Broadband Industry Prac-
tices, Petition of Free Press et al. for Declaratory Ruling that Degrading an Internet Applica-
tion Violates the FCC's Internet Policy Statement and Does Not Meet an Exception for
"Reasonable Network Management," Memorandum Opinion and Order, 23 F.C.C.R 13,028,
13,030, 6 (Aug. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Free Press-Comcast Order]; Posting of Nate Ander-
son, Cox, Comcast Biggest BitTorrent Blockers in the World, to ARs TECHNICA,
http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2008/05/us-isps-biggest-bittorrent-blockers-in-the-
world.ars (May 15, 2008, 13:23 EST); Chloe Albanesius, Cox Says It Will Delay P2P, Soft-
ware Updates, PCMAG.COM, Jan. 28, 2009,
http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2339756,00.asp (last visited Apr. 11, 2010).
20 See, e.g., Tom Lowry, Time Warner Cable Expands Internet Usage Pricing, Busi-
NESSWEEK.COM, Mar. 31, 2009,
http://www.businessweek.com/technology/content/mar2009/tc2009033 1726397.htm (last
visited Apr. 11, 2010).
21 See infra Part IV.C.3.
22 See Posting of Nate Anderson, FCC Chairman Wants Network Neutrality, Wired and
Wireless, to ARS TECHNICA: LAW & DISORDER, http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2009/09/fcc-chairman-wants-network-neutrality-wired-and-wireless.ars (Sept.
21, 2009, 11:39 EST).




This content-lock-out tactic follows the common historical practice of
dominant incumbent distributors-from music composers to broadcasters and
cable operators-throughout the past two centuries to deprive upstart distribu-
tors of the content necessary to compete. 4 In almost every instance where in-
cumbent distributors engaged in content-lock-out tactics, government interven-
tion was eventually necessary to ensure competition. This intervention, often
long overdue, has taken many forms, but generally involved tweaking the gov-
ernment-made laws at the root of these content-lock-out tactics-copyright
law. Common remedies include immunities from liability and compulsory li-
censes for new distributors, which are also likely necessary here.
This Article is the first exploration of the incumbent television industry's
programming-based tactics, their effect on online television, and how federal
copyright policy could counteract these tactics and therefore ensure the oppor-
tunity for disruptive competition and innovation in video-delivery.
This Article addresses these issues in four parts. Part II provides background
on the current market structure for video-delivery and previous government
attempts to promote competition in that market. Part III discusses the rise of
online video-delivery, and the incumbent industry's previous three tactics to
undermine online television. Part IV details the incumbents' programming-
based strategies, notably content-lock-out for both computers and the big
screen TV, and a new industry-wide initiative called TV Everywhere. Finally,
Part V discusses potential remedies for policy-makers to counteract the effects
of these content-lock-out tactics and provide breathing space for the disruptive
competition made possible by Internet technologies. The main policy proposal
is a sweeping compulsory license to benefit copyright-holders and new en-
trants while limiting the ability of incumbent MVPDs to engage in content-
lock-out.
II. THE INCUMBENT MVPD INDUSTRY
This part provides background on the existing cable market structure and on
how online television would hurt dominant distributors. It then discusses the
incumbents' earlier tactics used to thwart online television. The MVPD indus-
try historically has not been competitive. As a result, its few dominant players
have long feared the Internet would create disruptive new competitors upset-
ting that market structure. The Internet can enable cord-cutting, injecting com-
petition, and increasing independence for programmers. The incumbents have
24 See, e.g., MARVIN AMMORI, FREE PRESS, TV COMPETITION NOWHERE: How THE CA-
BLE INDUSTRY Is COLLUDING TO KILL ONLINE TV 2 (2010),
http://www.freepress.net/files/TV-Nowhere.pdf.
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engaged in network neutrality violations, over charges on data and device-
control to undermine TV online.
A. The Cable Industry's Current, Concentrated Market Structure
The cable industry consists of two cozy overlapping oligopolies-the pow-
erful distribution companies and the powerful programming companies, which
often own stakes in one another.25 Companies like Comcast, Time Warner Ca-
ble, Viacom, CBS, and NBC Universal love the current market structure. Con-
sumers pay a high price every month for channels chosen by the distributors,
for on-demand channels, and to rent the set-top box of the distributors' choice.
The powerful programmers negotiate for a cut of those above-lost profits.
The only losers in this arrangement are smaller programmers (which either
cannot get carried on an MVPD or must give equity to a big MVPD or big
programmer to get carried) and smaller MVPDs (which have to pay through
the nose for popular programming because they lack the leverage of larger dis-
tributors).26 The ultimate loser, however, is the U.S. consumer stuck with rising
bills, a limited choice of distributors, and an inability to watch smaller pro-
grammers that are shut out of the system.
Online television strikes at the very heart of the cozy cable model. The in-
cumbents fear that online television would inject competition into this stag-
nant, concentrated market, would liberate television by giving viewers control
over what channels and programs they watch, and would return thousands of
dollars to pockets of consumers.
1. Distribution
In a market worth billions annually," a cable operator such as Comcast,
Time Warner Cable, or Cox is usually the lone local cable operator in any
town, having long ago received government-backed monopolies and guaran-
teed returns.28 In the 1990s, satellite operators were able to compete more ef-
25 Cf Posting of Marvin Ammori, Cable Industry Claims Collusion is Pro-Consumer:
Response of NCTA on TV Everywhere, to HUFFINGTONPOST,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marvin-ammori/cable-industry-claims-col-b 411748.html
(Jan. 5, 2010, 11:45 EST).
26 See Posting of Adam Lynn, How Cable Programming is 'Chosen'- The Implications
for Comcast-NBC, to StopBigMedia.com,
http://www.stopbigmedia.com/blog/2010/0 1/how-cable-programming-is-chosen-the-
implications-for-comcast-nbc/ (Jan. 11, 2010).
27 One Wall Street analyst, Laura Martin of Soleil Media-Metrics, estimates "the current
worth of all the companies involved in television production and distribution" at $300 bil-
lion. Arango, supra note 15.
28 Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 56 F.3d 151, 183 (D.C. Cir. 1995) ("The monopo-
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fectively, largely through regulatory changes such as a compulsory copyright
license for broadcasting and program access rules requiring cable operators to
make their content available to rival satellite providers.29 This decade, after
years of promises, telephone companies finally entered the MVPD business,
with the benefit of regulatory changes," though their deployment currently
does not reach more than forty percent of U.S. homes at best.3' So far, govern-
ment attempts to increase competition in the MVPD market have resulted in
only four players at most, with the local cable operator still dominant. And
entry barriers are so high that additional facilities-based competitors are not
expected to emerge.32 For consumers, the distribution market is local, not na-
tional. The local cable operator retains roughly 68 percent of the local MVPD
consumer market, according to the most recent FCC study in 2007."3 The satel-
lite operators DirecTV and EchoStar roughly split most of the rest, though
phone companies are making inroads.3" More recent figures, which are not
available, would likely show that Verizon's FiOS product has taken some mar-
ket share, though FiOS is available only in a few, generally wealthy, and
densely populated communities. These local markets are oligopolies; indeed,
the cable operators' 68 percent share may signify monopoly power, and cer-
tainly constitutes market power.35 This limited competition and the insur-
lies most cable operators now enjoy resulted from exclusive franchises granted by local
authorities."). Congress passed the 1992 Cable Act in part to prohibit local franchising au-
thorities from granting exclusive franchises to cable operators. See Cable Television Con-
sumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, § 7(a), 106 Stat. 1460,
1483 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2006)). However, competition among cable opera-
tors has not materialized, primarily due to the high cost of entry in established markets. See
Gary Wax, Cable Company Monopoly: Comcast and Time Warner Control the Board, 28
Loy. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 159, 173-74 (2008).
29 17 U.S.C. §§ 119, 122(a); Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, sec. 19, § 628(c)(2)(C), 106 Stat. 1460, 1494 (1992).
30 Section 621 NPRM, supra note 14, 1-5. See also Sarah Jane Tribble, TV, Phone,
Internet: Choosing a Provider ofAll Three, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2008, at B5.
31 See Verizon, Verizon FiOS - Fact Sheet, http://newscenter.verizon.com/kit/fios-
symmetrical-intemet-service/alI-about-fios.html (last visited Mar. 31, 2010) (noting that the
total FiOS network passed 15.4 million homes as of Dec. 31, 2009); AT&T, U-verse Up-
date: 4Q09, http://www.att.com/common/merger/files/pdf/4Q09_U-verseUpdate.pdf (noting
that U-verse passed nearly 23 million homes as of December 31, 2009).
32 Cf See In re Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the
Delivery of Video Programming, Thirteenth Annual Report, 24 F.C.C.R. 542, 7 (Nov. 27,
2007) [hereinafter 2007 MVPD Competition Report].
33 Id. 8.
34 Id. 75, 178; Verizon, All About FiOS, http://newscenter.verizon.com/kit/fios-
symmetrical-intemet-service/all-about-fios.html (last visited Mar. 23, 2010) (noting that
Verizon's FiOS TV offering had 2.86 million customers in the U.S. at the end of 2009).
35 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY: SINGLE-FIRM CONDUCT
UNDER SECTION 2 OF THE SHERMAN ACT 19-22 (Sept. 2008) (report withdrawn in 2009 for
reasons not affecting veracity of source material).
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mountable barriers to entry have resulted in even higher prices than existed
with just one competitor 6 (despite FCC predictions).37 This minimal competi-
tion results in bad outcomes for consumers. Cable operators have the lowest
consumer satisfaction ratings of any industry," even while they soak up large
profit margins and raise prices.39 Some had predicted that the advent of compe-
tition from satellite and phone companies would decrease prices and increase
quality.40 Those predicted benefits to consumers have not materialized. Broader
competition is sorely needed.
For programmers, unlike consumers, the distribution market is more na-
tional or regional; programmers can sell to more purchasers if different dis-
tributors operate, even if they operate in different towns. This national market
is also highly concentrated. In 2006, four MVPDs throughout the country,
which included the two primary satellite operators, "served 63 percent of all
MVPD subscribers."'" The top 10 MVPDs in the country served 87 percent of
subscribers. 2 The two largest were Comcast and Time Warner Cable.43
36 See KAYE HUSBANDS FEALING ET AL., CTR. FOR SCI. TECH & PUB. POL'Y, STATEWIDE
VIDEO FRANCHISING LEGISLATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF OUTCOMES IN TEXAS, CALI-
FORNIA AND MICHIGAN 16 (Mar. 2009) (noting that the price of MVPD services grew in both
California and Michigan, despite increased competition). See e.g., Brian Stelter, Next on
Cable, A Higher Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2010, at Al.
37 Section 621 NPRM, supra note 14, 2 ("New competitors are entering markets for
the delivery of services historically offered by monopolists: traditional phone companies are
primed to enter the cable market .... We believe this competition for delivery of bundled
services will benefit consumers by driving down prices and improving the quality of service
offerings.").
38 See American Customer Satisfaction Index, QI 2009 and Historical ACSI Scores,
May 19, 2009,
http://www.theacsi.org/index.php?option=comcontent&task=view&id= 80&Itemid=203
(last visited Apr. 15, 2010) (ranking the cable industry tied - with newspapers - for lowest
overall in the Information sector at 63 in 2009, and falling below wireless telephone compa-
nies).
39 See In re A National Broadband Plan for Our Future, Reply Comments of Free Press,
GN Docket No. 09-51, at 23-24 (July 21, 2009),
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/view?id=7019917712 (providing charts comparing
investment and profit margins of major telecom and cable providers, and comparing the
investment and margins with other capital-intensive sectors); see also In re Annual Assess-
ment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of Video Programming,
Reply Comments of Free Press, MB Docket No. 07-269, at 4-6 (Aug. 28, 2009),
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/ecfs/document/viewid=7020036944 [hereinafter Free Press MVPD
Reply] (discussing increasing prices in the MVPD marketplace).
40 Section 621 NPRM, supra note 14, 2.
41 2007 MVPD Competition Report, supra note 12, 9.
42 Id. 178.




The programming market is also concentrated, with a few dominant pro-
grammers, including both non-broadcasters and broadcasters.' Large non-
broadcast players, whose content is available only through an MVPD subscrip-
tion, include Viacom---owner of MTV Networks, Comedy Central and oth-
ers-and Time Warner, a content company that split off from Time Warner
Cable, and currently owns TBS, TNT and CNN.45 Broadcasters, available both
on MVPDs and free over-the-air, include ABC, NBC, CBS, and Fox." Cable
programmers have high profit margins based on adding two revenue sources-
advertising and per-subscriber fees.47 While programmers are sometimes
"cagey" about their financials, the head of NBC's cable channels stated her
channels' operating profit margins "are well over 50 percent."48
Programming is often vertically integrated, with distributors owning pro-
grammers. In the FCC's last report in 2007-before Time Warner's split from
Time Warner Cable-the FCC found that "of the 565 national non-broadcast
channels [it] identified, 84 [were] affiliated with a cable operator .... ,9 Doz-
ens more channels were affiliated with a satellite operator." Furthermore, at the
time, "[fWive of the top seven cable operators .. . [held] ownership interests in
satellite-delivered national programming networks."'"
The industry may become more consolidated if the proposed Comcast-NBC
Universal merger is approved.52 For example, Comcast currently owns E! En-
44 See MARK COOPER & DEREK TURNER, FREE PRESS, THE NEGATIVE EFFECT OF CON-
CENTRATION AND VERTICAL INTEGRATION ON DIVERSITY AND QUALITY IN VIDEO ENTER-
TAINMENT 2 (2007), available at
https://www.policyarchive.org/bitstream/handle/10207/8001/cooper%2520video.pdf.
45 About Viacom, http://www.viacom.com/aboutviacom/Pages/default.aspx (last visited
Feb. 22, 2010); Time Warner: Turner Broadcasting,
http://www.timewarner.com/corp/businesses/detail/turnerbroadcasting/index.htm (last
visited Feb. 22, 2010).
46 These networks own stations and then affiliate with stations across the country they
do not own. The network may negotiate carriage for its affiliates. See Melissa Grego, Re-
trans: The Bloody Battle to Save Broadcast Television, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Dec. 14,
2009; Paige Albiniak, NAB 2009: Top 25 Station Groups, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Apr.
20, 2009, available at http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/209430-
NAB_2009 Top 25_StationGroups.php.
47 See Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism, Cable TV: Economics,
http://www.stateofthemedia.org/2009/narrativecabletv_intro.php?media=7 (last visited
Feb. 22, 2010).
48 David Lieberman, Hammer Determined to Extend Cable Reach, USA TODAY, Mar.
23, 2009, at 6B.
49 2007 MVPD Competition Report, supra note 12, 187.
50 Id. 187-88.
51 Id. 20.
52 Posting of Ian Paul, NBC-Universal-Comcast Merger: What We Do and Don't Know,
to Today@PCWorld,
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tertainment Television, Versus, The Golf Channel, regional sports networks,
G4, and The Style Network, and has investments in TV One, PBS Kids Sprout,
MGM Holdings, NHL Network, Music Choice, Pittsburgh Cable News Chan-
nel LLC, and the MLB (Major League Baseball) Network. 3 If the Comcast-
NBC merger is approved, then Comcast would also own MSNBC, CNBC,
Bravo, USA Network, Syfy, the NBC network (which affiliates with hundreds
of broadcast stations), Telemundo, and a minority share in broadcaster ION
media, as well as more than 20 local NBC-owned-and-operated broadcast sta-
tions and a major interest in the online video service Hulu 4 Comcast also has
disclosed its equity interests in several smaller cable programmers.5
In a common practice that further increases vertical integration, MVPDs re-
quire small programmers to give up much of their companies' equity stock to
MVPDs just to get carried.56 As one programmer's CEO explained, "Cable and
satellite TV companies want to own you before they put you on television." 7
(If true, this is already illegal under communications laws.)5 Programmers
have argued that distributors collectively "blackball" any programmer who
files a carriage complaint against one distributor;59 in addition, distributors may
simply copy the programmers' format and deny carriage (or threaten to do so
in negotiations).6" In addition to the formal consolidation, a former cable ex-
http://www.pcworld.com/article/I 83652/nbcuniversalcomcast mergerwhat we do and d
ont know.html (Dec. 3, 2009, 16:40 EST).
53 Mike Farrell, Is Comcast Trolling For Content?, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Sept. 9,
2009, http://www.multichannel.com/article/340014-
Is Comcast TrollingFor Content .php; Posting of Matthew Lasar, What Exactly Does
Comcast Already Own? Here's a List, to ARSTECHNICA,
http://arstechnica.com/media/news/2009/12/what-exactly-does-comcast-already-own-heres-
a-list.ars (Dec. 7, 2009, 10:05 EST); Paul, supra note 52; Posting of Andrew Ross Sorkin, In
NBC Universal Bid, Comcast Seeks an Empire, to N.Y. TIMES DEALBOOK BLOG,
http://dealbook.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/10/02/in-nbc-universal-bid-comcast-seeks-an-
empire/ (Oct. 2, 2009, 07:30).
54 NBC Universal, NBCU TELEVISION GROUP (cont.),
http://www.nbcuni.com/AboutNBCUniversal/CompanyOverview/overview03.shtml
(last visited Apr. 10, 2010); NBC Universal, NBC UNIVERSAL TELEVISION GROUP,
http://www.nbcuni.com/About NBCUniversal/CompanyOverview/overview02.shtml
(last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
55 Rafat Ali, Comcast Units Not Part of The Deal, and Its Undisclosed Stakes, PAID-
CONTENT.ORG, Dec. 4, 2009, http://paidcontent.org/article/419-sec-watch-comcast-units-
not-part-of-the-deal-and-its-stakes-including-c/.
56 See Free Press MVPD Reply, supra note 39, at 9-10.
57 Id.
58 47 U.S.C. § 536(a)(1) (2006); 47 C.F.R. § 76.1301(a).
59 FCC Tackles Cable Programming Bundling Practices,
www.freepress.net/files/MM 2012-12-08 20TRANSCRIPT.doc (last visited Feb. 23,
2010) (transcript of Media Minutes podcast from Dec. 12, 2008)
60 See, e.g., Jon Hemingway, WealthTV Files Carriage Complaint Against Time War-




ecutive points out "[a]ll of the executives at the top of these [cable] companies
have been in and around the industry for years and have close personal and
professional ties."'"
3. Money Flows
MVPDs charge consumers monthly subscription fees for packages of con-
tent at generally unregulated high prices. 2 With these revenues, the distributors
pay programmers (their suppliers) a per-subscriber fee for every house that
receives the programmers' channel.63 The fee may decrease based on granting
advertising slots to the distributor and based on channel placement.' MVPDs
pay about a third of collected subscriber fees to cable programmers (the other
two-thirds includes much of the continued profit from TV subscriptions).
These fees comprise half of the programmers' revenues, with the other half
coming largely from advertising.65 These deals vary based on the market power
of the programmer and the distributor.6 Some "must-have" non-broadcast pro-
grammers, such as ESPN (owned by Disney) can charge large per-subscriber
fees. For instance, Comcast pays ESPN's owners $4.08 per subscriber per
month.67
WealthTVFilesCarriageComplaint Against Time Wamer.php.
61 Posting of Will Richmond, The Cable Industry Closes Ranks, to VideoNuze.com,
http://videonuze.com/blogs/?2008-11-12/The-Cable-Industry-Closes-Ranks/&id=2004
(Nov. 12, 2008, 09:45 EST).
62 See Free Press MVPD Reply, supra note 39, at 3-4.
63 See Posting of Joe Flint, Cable vs. Broadcast Isn 't a Fair Fight, to COMPANY TOWN,
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/entertainmentnewsbuzz/2009/l 1/cable-vs-broadcast-isnt-a-
fair-fight.html (Nov. 2, 2009, 10:23 PST).
64 Brian Steinberg, Conan Deal Shows the Power of the Cable TV Business Model,
TVWEEK, http://www.tvweek.com/news/2010/04/conandealshowsthe-power of.php
(last visited April 20, 2010); posting of Joe Flint, Want A Better Spot On The Dial In New
York City? Open Up Your Wallet, to COMPANY TOWN,
http://Iatimesblogs.latimes.com/entertainmentnewsbuzz/2009/07/want-a-better-channel-in-
new-york-city-open-up-your-wallet.html (July 22, 2009, 14:35 PST).
65 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, ISSUES RELATED TO COMPETITION AND SUBSCRIBER
SERVICE RATES IN THE CABLE TELEVISION INDUSTRY 29-31 (2003) [hereinafter GAO RE-
PORT]; see Posting of Bill Niemeyer, Today's Cable TV 'Revenue Split' and Why Over the
Top Likely Can't Be Ad-Supported Only, to BillNiemeyer.tv,
http://billniemeyer.tv/2009/05/1 0/todays-cable-tv-revenue-split-and-why-over-the-top-
likely-cant-be-ad-supported-only/ (May 10, 2009).
66 Broadcasters, such as ABC (owned by Disney), have the legal benefits of "must-
carry," under which they can generally require MVPDs to carry their broadcast channels.
See 47 U.S.C 534. Broadcasters can also select not to exercise "must-carry," but to negotiate
for payment or other additional benefits for carriage. Most popular broadcasters elect nego-
tiations. This is known as retransmission consent. See 47 U.S.C. § 325(b).
67 Posting of Peter Kafka, Hate Paying for Cable? Here's Why, to All Things Digital,
http://mediamemo.allthingsd.com/20100308/hate-paying-for-cable-heres-the-reason-why/
(Mar. 8, 2010, 5:00 PST).
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Because broadcast channels (such as affiliates of ABC, NBC, Fox, and
CBS) are available over the air for free, cable operators historically resisted
paying fees to broadcasters for carriage. Rather, operators would agree to carry
other programming owned by the broadcaster (like NBC's cable properties).68
Today, some broadcasters have succeeded in negotiating per-subscriber fees. 9
Perhaps because their content is already available for free over the air, broad-
casters like those participating in Hulu have been relatively quick to distribute
content online.
4. MVPDs 'Interest in Internet Access Providers
MVPDs can attempt to use their control of Internet access in targeting online
television. All the dominant providers of high-speed Internet access are also
MVPDs. The local cable and phone monopolies dominate residential fixed-line
Internet access; 96 percent of the country has two or fewer choices for wired
broadband." The top high-speed Internet access providers include AT&T,
Comcast, Verizon, Time Warner Cable, Cox, and others. This situation allows
these MVPDs to charge consumers twice--once for Internet access and once
for an MVPD subscription.7 Today, cable operators make between fifty per-
cent and sixty percent of their revenues from their MVPD service, while the
balance comes from Internet access and phone services." They would make
less money, all else equal, if consumers paid them only for Internet access.
5. Standardized Contract Terms
Negotiations for programming are often long-term, with contracts between
distributors and content providers lasting as long as seven years.73 Moreover,
68 GAO REPORT, supra note 65, at 29-30.
69 See Mike Farrell & Linda Moss, Ops, Broadcasters Give Peace A Chance, MUL-
TICHANNEL NEWS, Jan 10, 2009, at 6.
70 See, e.g., FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, CONNECTION AMERICA: THE NATIONAL BROAD-
BAND PLAN, at 37. See also ConuInents of Free Press, (Sixth) Inquiry Concerning the De-
ployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability Pursuant to Section 706, GN Docket
09-51, Sep. 4, 2009, at 46, 48. Satellite operators also offer Internet access, as do wireless
providers, but their offerings are inferior to wireline offerings; even if these offerings are
considered competitive with wireline offerings, they have minimal market share. Id. at 47.
71 In the 1990s, cable companies began offering telephony services as part of a "double
play" package. See INT'L ENGINEERING CONSORTIUM, ACHIEVING THE TRIPLE PLAY: TECH-
NOLOGIES AND BUSINESS MODELS FOR SUCCESS: COMPREHENSIVE REPORT 55 (2006). Today,
many companies offer "triple play" packages that provide high-speed Internet, telephone,
and video services to consumers. Id.
72 See, e.g., Comcast, Comcast Investor Relations - Earnings,
http://www.cmcsa.com/eamings.cfn (following "Trending Schedules" hyperlink).
73 Sinclair Broadcast Group, Inc., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 39 (Mar. 4, 2009),
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these contracts, particularly among the largest distributors, generally include
"most favored nation" clauses that grant the distributor the benefit of any con-
tract negotiated with a rival distributor.74 As a result, terms of the contracts of-
ten are standardized across the MVPD industry. In addition, and of particular
relevance to this paper, these contracts cover "alternative distribution meth-
ods," such as online television delivery. These terms generally limit what con-
tent the programmer can make available online on its own Web sites and, par-
ticularly, on third-party Web sites, to ensure that these online distributors (like
Apple or Verizon) cannot compete with MVPDs."
6. Set-Top Boxes
MVPDs also derive revenue from leasing set-top boxes to consumers.76
These boxes are often needed for on-demand and high-definition offerings and
frequently include DVR capabilities." The incumbents can generate huge fees
from renting these boxes because they dominate the market for them and have





74 Gil Ehrenkranz, Mapping the 'Most Favored Nation,' MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Feb. 10,
2008, http://www.multichannel.com/article/88046-
Mappingthe MostFavoredNation_.php.
75 Richmond, supra note 61 ("The cable industry ... has closed ranks to frown heavily
on the idea of cable programming, which operators pay those monthly affiliate fees for,
showing up for free on the web, or ... in online aggregators' (e.g. Hulu, YouTube, Veoh,
etc.) sites.").
76 See Posting of Saul Hansell, F.C.C. May Pry Open the Cable Set-Top Box, to N.Y.
TIMES BITSBLOG, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/12/04/watch-out-comcast-the-fcc-may-
not-let-you-favor-nbc/ (Dec. 4, 2009, 12:58 EST).
77 See Comcast Cable, Digital Cable Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.comcastcableoffers.com/faqvideo/ (last visited April 14, 2010) ("The Digital
Cable box is required to view any programs ON DEMAND (where available) and premium
or pay per-view channels that Comcast offers."); Comcast, DVR & HD-DVR Service from
Comcast, http://www.comcast.com/Corporate/Learn/DigitalCable/DVR.html (last visited
Apr. 16, 2010).
78 See Posting of Cecilia Kang, Consumer Electronics Group Calls for Broad FCC Set
Top Box Review, to WASH. POST POST TECH,
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2009/1 1/its been more thansix.html (Nov. 24,
2009, 09:26 EST); Matthew Lasar, Sneak Peek at FCC National Broadband Plan Gets
Mixed Reviews, ARS TECHNICA, Dec. 17, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/news/2009/ I2/sneak-peek-of-fcc-national-broadband-plan-gets-mixed-reviews.ars
(pointing out that "to this date only 14 set-top boxes not directly leased from a cable com-
pany were on the market in the United States").
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B. Government Attempts to Promote Competition in the MVPD Markets
The government has attempted to promote competition in the MVPD market
for many years, with very limited success, largely because of the difficult tradi-
tional cost-structure and poor implementation. Congress' attempts to foster
competition took the form of two major revisions to the Communications Act
in 1984 and 1992, and numerous FCC implementing regulations.79 With these
statutes and rules, the government has attempted to foster competition in both
the MVPD market and in adjacent markets that the MVPDs could threaten to
dominate, such as programming and end-user devices.
To foster competition in the MVPD market, Congress and the FCC at-
tempted to encourage market entry by competitors such as traditional phone
companies and satellite operators. For example, Congress and the FCC have
removed numerous federal regulatory limits on satellite operators," forbidden
exclusive cable franchises,8' and radically streamlined the process for phone
companies to obtain a local cable franchise."
In addition, the government has employed rules to address content-lock-out
to ensure that MVPDs could exist and grow. For example, in 1974, the Su-
preme Court determined that the Copyright Act granted cable operators an ef-
fective immunity to air local and out-of-market broadcast channels.83 In re-
sponse to the Supreme Court's decision, Congress enacted a compulsory li-
cense statute regulating out-of-market broadcasts, enabling cable operators to
air such broadcasts without permission, and maintained the immunity for in-
market stations. 4 In addition, Congress enacted a compulsory license provision
for satellite operators to air broadcasting and directed the FCC to adopt rules
forbidding cable operators from coercing exclusive arrangements with cable
programmers or discriminating in the provision of affiliated programming."
79 Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2780 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
80 Satellite Home Viewer Improvement Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-113, app. I, 113
Stat. 150 1A-523 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 17 & 47 U.S.C.).
81 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2006).
82 See In re Implementation of Section 621(a)(1) of the Cable Communications Policy
Act of 1984 as Amended by the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992, Second Report and Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 5101, 4, 6.
83 See Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 415 U.S. 394, 405 (1974)
(holding that CATV operators were not liable for copyright infringement of broadcasters'
rights because they did not "perform" the broadcasts under the definition of the Copyright
Act).
84 Copyright Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-553, 90 Stat. 2541 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §
111(c) (2006)).
85 Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, 102 Stat. 3935, 3949 (codi-
fied at 17 U.S.C. § 119 (2006)); Cable Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1484,
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These acts have had very limited success, as the cost-structure of wireline
deployment and satellite operations ensure very few competitors in the market.
While the government has helped the marketplace develop some competitors,
even that limited competition has yet to result in the usual benefits of real
competition, such as lower prices. 6
The government has also adopted laws ostensibly to ensure competitive
markets in the adjacent programming and end-user device markets. For pro-
grammers, the government sought to bar coercive actions by cable operators
and to promote independent programmers through vertical ownership caps and
leased access rules, both of which have failed. 7 For end user devices, Con-
gress attempted to unlock cable operators' control over set-top box devices and
to spur competition in the market in both the 1992 Cable Act and the 1996
Telecommunications Act.88 The FCC has implemented ineffective rules to fol-
low through, and, having recently conceded failure, appears to be attempting
again."
While these policies have failed, partly due to the pre-Internet technological
realities, and partly due to the perennial capture of the FCC, the Internet pro-
vides the best hope for meaningful competition in video resulting in competi-
tive benefits to consumers.
III. THE TECHNOLOGIES, POTENTIAL FOR, AND THREATS TO
ONLINE TV
New technologies and services enable Americans to watch television, in
high-definition, on their television screens, through the Internet. This part dis-
cusses (1) these technologies and services, (2) the ways such technologies and
services threaten the incumbent industry by enabling cord-cutting, competition,
and increased programmer independence, and (3) several strategies imple-
mented by incumbents to attack online television: network neutrality, cap-and-
1488 (1992) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 536(a)(2)-(3) (2006)).
86 See Frank Ahrens, Comcast Wins Appeal of FCC Ownership Cap, WASH. POST, Aug.
29, 2009, at A10.
87 See Time Warner Entm't Co. v. FCC, 240 F.3d 1126, 1137 (2001) (holding that the
FCC's forty percent vertical limit was based on insufficient information and analysis); John
Eggerton, Court Grants Stay of FCC's Leased-Access-Rate Reduction, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, May 22, 2008, available at http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/ 13842-
Court Grants Stayof_FCCs Leased Access Rate Reduction.php.
88 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 304, 110 Stat. 56, 125-26
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 548); Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act
of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.
(2006)).
89 Nate Anderson, FCC Admits CableCARD a Failure, Vows to Try Something Else,
ARS TECHNICA, Dec. 4, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/12/fcc-admits-
cablecard-a-failure-vows-to-try-something-else.ars.
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metered prices, and set-top-box control.
A. Technologies of Online Television
With new technologies, companies can deliver television content through an
Internet connection (or, as they say in the industry, "over the top"90 of an Inter-
net connection) and deliver that content to the television screen.9 Online tele-
vision distribution includes a range of business models, including subscription,
per-episode fees, advertiser-supported, or some combination. Distributors in-
clude Hulu, which already has 40 million monthly viewers and hundreds of
advertisers.92 Companies like Miro and Vuze have also offered high-definition
video.93 Apple has enjoyed success selling movies and shows by the episode,94
and is now in the process of assembling a monthly subscription television ser-
vice that may prove disruptive to the MVPD industry.95 YouTube is adding
full-length films to its user-generated content and splitting the resulting ad
revenue with the content owners.96 Some niche start-up entities offer special-
ized content; for example, one company caters to aviation and air-show enthu-
siasts with high-definition video.97
Users are also now streaming online television content to more screens-to
the computer, the mobile handheld, and the television set. Consumers use sim-
ple technological connections like inexpensive cords or more convenient
methods like set-top box devices (Apple TV, Roku, Vudu), and gaming con-
soles (Sony's Playstation 3 and Microsoft's Xbox), BluRay players, and Wi-Fi
enabled televisions. Apple TV is a device retailing at a few hundred dollars
that connects a television screen to an Internet connection and gives users the
90 Leslie Ellis, Get Ready For Over-the-Top Video, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, July 10,
2005, http://www.multichannel.com/article/88089-
Get ReadyForOver the TopVideo.php.
91 See, e.g., Jacqui Cheng, Possible Apple TV Subscription Service Faces Uphill Battle,
ARS TECHNICA, Dec. 22, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/apple/news/2009/12/possible-apple-
tv-subscription-service-faces-uphill-battle.ars.
92 See sources cited supra note 1.
93 See, e.g., Vuze, http://www.vuze.com/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2010); Miro,
http://www.getmiro.com/ (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
94 See Jacqui Cheng, iTunes Welcomes HD TV From More Major Networks, ARs TECH-
NICA, Oct. 16, 2006, http://arstechnica.com/apple/news/2008/l0/itunes-welcomes-hd-tv-
from-more-major-networks.ars.
95 Sam Schechner & Yukari Iwatani Kane, Apple TV Proposal Gets Some Nibbles,
WALL ST. J., December 22, 2009, at B 1.
96 Jacqui Cheng, YouTube Launching Premium Section with Movies, TV Shows, ARS
TECHNICA, Apr. 16, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/media/news/2009/04/youtube-to-gain-
premium-movie-tv-section.ars.
97 Ben Griffiths, Superfly Guys: Three Enthusiasts Believe Online TV Can Revolutionise




ability, using a remote control, to purchase and watch high-definition movies
and television shows from the iTunes store, listen to music, and view photos.98
Roku, spun off by Netflix, sells a device for under $100 that streams television
content from Netflix, Amazon VOD (offering 45,000 movies and television
shows99), and Major League Baseball's site.' Vudu also enables online televi-
sion viewing through use of an add-on box.' The Playstation 3 and XBox are
popular gaming consoles that also function as home entertainment centers, par-
ticularly when beaming online television to television screens. Xbox offers
high-definition movies through Netflix.0 2 BluRay players, now the industry
standard for high-definition disc-based video, often have online television ca-
pabilities, including Netflix capability. 03
Boxee is software that enables users to explore online content from
CBS.com, Comedy Central and other sites using a device like Apple TV or a
computer, and potentially a television's built-in Internet connection, game con-
soles, and Blu-Ray players."° In December 2009, Boxee unveiled its plan for
set-top box pre-loaded with Boxee software. 5 The New York Times has re-
ported that Boxee's software has a "well-organized directory,"'0 6 "unlike the
increasingly long and convoluted channel directories on most cable and satel-
lite systems."'0 7 Boxee also embeds social networking features enabling users
to view, rate, and recommend content through its interface.' Boxee has raised
millions from investors.' And Boxee is not alone: another technology called
98 Apple TV, http://www.apple.com/appletv/what-is.html (last visited Feb. 26, 2010);
Apple TV - Apple Store (U.S.),
http://store.apple.com/us/browse/home/shopipod/family/apple tv?aid=AIC-WWW-NAUS-
K2-BUYNOW-APPLETV-WHAT+IS+APPLE+TV%3F&cp=BUYNOW-APPLETV-
WHAT+IS+APPLE+TV%3F (last visited Feb. 26, 2010).
99 Roth, supra note 17, at 122.
'oo Id.
101 Vudu-Product-Overview, http://www.vudu.com/product-overview.html (last visited
Feb. 26, 2010).
102 Netflix on Xbox LIVE, http://www.xbox.com/en-US/live/netflix/default.htm (last
visited Feb. 26, 2010).
103 See, e.g., Crutchfield, Samsung BD-P3600, http://www.crutchfield.com/S-
ddUwMCm8Akv/p_305BD3600/Samsung-BD-P3600.html (last visited Apr. 13, 2010).
104 See Chloe Albanesius, Boxee Lands Deal for Set-Top 'Boxee Box,' PCMAG.COM,
Nov. 12, 2009, http:/www.pcmag.com/article2/0,28 17,2355815,00.asp.
105 See id; Posting of Andrew Kippen, Step 1: Make a Boxee Box (No Need to Cut a
Hole), to Boxee Blog, http://blog.boxee.tv/2009/12/09/step-l-make-a-boxee-box-no-need-
to-cut-a-hole/ (Dec. 9, 2009, 9:00 EST).
106 Brad Stone, Way to View Web on TV Finds Fans, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 2009, at B1.
107 Id.
108 Posting of Greg Sandoval, Turning the TV into a 'Social-Media Center,' to CNET
NEWS BLOG, http:l/news.cnet.com/8301-10784_3-9965864-7.html (June 11, 2008, 10:14
PDT).
109 See Posting of Brad Stone, Boxee Raises Another $6 Million for Assault on Big Me-
dia, to N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG, http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/08/12/boxee-raises-
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Plex Media Center, built off the same open source media player, is available
for and popular among Mac Users."'
One of the most popular online television offerings is Netflix, a company
known initially for offering DVDs through the mail for monthly subscription
fees."' Netflix now offers media content through the Internet. It has close to 11
million subscribers and offers programming to numerous devices, having em-
bedded its software in nearly 10 million televisions, DVD players, game con-
soles like Microsoft's Xbox 360, and laptops." 2 As Wired noted, "Microsoft
incorporated the service into its Windows Media Center software, meaning
everyone with [Microsoft] Vista can stream Netflix to their TV."' 3 As a result,
Netflix "routs around" the MVPDs. In so doing, Netflix acted "surreptitiously"
to avoid "the wrath of the [cable] giants.""' 4
B. The Incumbents' Fears of Online Television
The availability and popularity of these devices and technologies causes
three main fears for the MVPDs-cord-cutting, competition, and losing market
power over programmers.
1. Cord-cutting
"Cord-cutting" refers to cancelling an MVPD subscription."5 It consists of
consumers leaving the market for MVPDs, or, alternatively, selecting virtual
MVPDs as competitive substitutes. As one cable trade publication noted, cord-
cutting is "becoming easier than ever" since consumers can watch television
through the Internet, supplemented by over-the-air digital broadcasts." 6 By
2009, eight percent of Internet users had hooked up their computers to their
televisions so they could stream Internet content to the larger screens." 7 Publi-
cations often feature families cutting the cord and saving hundreds or thou-
sands of dollars a year. "
8
another-6-million-for-assault-on-big-media/ (Aug. 12, 2009, 11:00 EST).
110 See Plex Media Center for OS X, http://www.plexapp.com/ (last visited Apr. 15,
2010).
I Netflix, Overview, http://ir.netflix.com/ (last visited Mar. 7, 2010).
112 Roth, supra note 17, at 123-24.
113 Id. at 125.
'"4 Id. at 124.
"15 Cf HARRY NEWTON, NEWTON'S TELECOM DICTIONARY 319 (25th ed. 2009).
116 Todd Spangler, Breaking Free, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Nov. 1, 2008,
http://www.multichannel.com/article/85964-Cover StoryBreakingFree.php.
".. MARY MADDEN, PEW INTERNET & AMERICAN LIFE PROJECT, THE AUDIENCE FOR ON-
LINE VIDEO-SHARING SITES SHOOTS UP 4 (2009).
118 See, e.g., Douglas Quenqua, Can a Mouse Cut the Cable?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
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One publication quoted a user who canceled cable and uses Apple TV: "It's
tough to justify paying $100 a month for TV programming when so much is
available online.""' 9 Another publication noted that some think Boxee is "a way
to euthanize that costly $100-a-month cable or satellite connection,"'20 and
quoted one Boxee user saying, "[m]ost people my age would like to just pay
for the channels they want, but cable refuses to give us that option."' 2' The
CEO of Roku has publicly stated, "[o]ur goal is to have everyone cancel their
cable subscription."'2 Roku provides 10 channels to its box; as one reporter
noted, "if some bigger names in content-Hulu, are you listening?-were to
sign on to make channels, [Roku] would be truly be an excellent replacement
for cable."'23
A recent article in the New York Times described one family's use of an in-
expensive mini computer, an Xbox (which was not even "absolutely neces-
sary"), Boxee, Hulu, and Netflix to cancel their monthly $140 cable subscrip-
tion and save $1,600 a year.'24 Thirty-five percent of respondents in a March
2009 survey said they would consider canceling their MVPD subscription
within the next five years to watch television exclusively on the Internet."5
Americans already could watch a third of their television hours without an
MVPD subscription on over-the-air standard- and high-definition digital chan-
nels available with an antenna for free. 2 6 While clearly not all Americans will
cancel their subscriptions in the short term, millions of households could. As
one financial analyst observed, "people are starting to wonder, do we even
need the cable connections?"'
127
Whether or not consumers will actually cut the cord, cable providers clearly
2010, at D1; Nick Bilton, Cable Freedom, Aided by a Mouse, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 2009, at
B5. See also Marguerite Reardon, You Don't Need Satellite TV When Times Get Tough,
CNET.coM, Dec. 19, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/830 1-1035_3-10125962-94.html.
119 Spangler, supra note 116.
120 Stone, supra note 109.
121 Id
122 Roth, supra note 17, at 124. As Wired noted, MVPDs and programmers are "some of
the most powerful incumbents in media," and they "have successfully stymied or co-opted
all previous entrepreneurial efforts." Id.
123 Chris Foresman, First Look: Roku Channel Store Expands Connected Set-Top Box,
ARS TECHNICA, Nov. 23, 2009, http://arstechnica.com/media/news/2009/1 1/first-look-roku-
channel-store-expands-connected-set-top-box.ars.
124 Bilton, supra note 118.
125 Cable TV Follows Its Subscribers to the Internet, Knowledge@ Wharton, July 22,
2009, http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2295.
126 Cf Wayne Friedman, Cable Share Grows, Broadcast Recedes, MEDIA POST NEWS,
Dec. 9, 2009,
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/?fa=Articles.showArticle&artaid=1 18859 (last
visited Apr. 15, 2010).
127 Dawn C. Chmielewski & Meg James, Hulu's Tug of War with TV, L.A. TIMES, May
11, 2009, at B 1.
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fear the possibility. "We are starting to see the beginning of cord cutting...
People will choose not to buy subscription video if they can get the same stuff
for free," said Glenn Britt, the chief executive of Time Warner Cable in Febru-
ary 2009.28 A senior vice president at Cablevision-owned Rainbow Media
Holdings, which owns channels like AMC and LFC, said, "My biggest fear
would be not so much people cutting the cord, but the younger generation
coming up and never buying into [an MVPD].' 1 29 A recent report by the firm
SNL Kagan concludes that "videos over the Internet will continue to erode the
subscriber base from the multichannel services vendors in the United States,"
though perhaps less than MVPDs fear. 3 '
While cord-cutting is likely further in the future for most Americans, many
Americans may turn to existing devices and services-like Netflix and Hulu-
instead of paying a few dollars for a television show on-demand or a monthly
fee to rent a cable DVR. As the cable industry would like to preserve and ex-
pand DVR and on-demand revenues, this is a real threat to them. MVPDs.
They would rather charge consumers-for MVPD, for on demand video, and
for Internet service. These operators "worry that the proliferation of free video
on the Web-and downloadable shows on Apple iTunes-may be harming the
$60-billion-a-year subscription video business by allowing people to unplug
their cable services."'' As Professor Jonathan Taplin noted, MVPDs would
prefer you not cancel your MVPD subscription and "that you pay them 70
bucks a month for maybe a lot of channels you don't use."'32
MVPDs fear, in short, "cannibalizing" their existing MVPD subscriptions
128 Deborah Yao, Cable Companies See Customers Cutting Back: "The Beginning Of
Cord Cutting, " HUFFINGTON POST, Feb. 8, 2009,
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/02/09/cable-companies-see-custo-n165138.html.
129 Steve Donohue, Cisco: Set-Top Data Could Boost 'TV Everywhere,' LIGHT READING,
Nov. 19, 2009, http://www.lightreading.com/document.asp?doc-id= 1 84825&site=cdn.
130 Mike Robuck, Report: 07T Eating Into Video Market Share Pie, CED MAGAZINE,
Oct. 9, 2009, available at http://www.cedmagazine.com/News-OTT-video-market-share-
100909.aspx.
'31 Brad Stone & Brian Stelter, Web TV, for Subscribers Only, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,
2009, at B 1.
132 Laura Sydell, Hooking Up PC To TV Could Be Near, NPR.ORG, Mar. 12, 2009,
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld= 101823872. Cable operators note this
reality themselves when discussing the benefits of moving to switched digital video. Com-
cast CTO Tony Werner noted, "It's clear that the last 200 to 300 channels are watched such
a small fraction of the time ... if you never have more than 40 streams watched out of 200."
Leslie Ellis, How Sexy is HFC? (Answer: Plenty.), CED MAGAZINE, May 1, 2007,
http://www.cedmagazine.com/article.aspx?id=146993. The FCC has confirmed that cable
service prices continue to rise out of pace with inflation or investment. See In re Implemen-
tation of Section 3 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of
1992; Statistical Report on Average Rates for Basic Service, Cable Programming Service,
and Equipment, Report on Cable Industry Prices, 21 F.C.C.R. 15,087, 2 (2006).
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with their Internet subscriptions.'33 The idea of consumers watching online
television on television sets "terrifies television networks and distributors,"'34
and programs such as Boxee represent a "potentially dangerous idea for the TV
industry."'35 As a result, according to press reports, "some [MVPDs] are trying
to make sure people have a reason to keep paying hefty cable bills."'36
2. Competition
Online television could disrupt the cable industry's oligopoly markets, in-
jecting long-sought competition in markets like subscription and on-demand
viewing. The entry costs for building an entire network-like the cable or
phone networks, built under government-sanctioned monopolies--or launching
a satellite are very high.'37 Because of the economics ofInternet-based distribu-
tion, online television distributors have low costs of entry. As a result, new
competitors like Roku could enter and take some market share, while MVPDs
will likely have to lower their MVPD prices or provide higher quality-in
short, to compete-to the benefit of consumers.
With online competition, companies like Comcast and Cox would be forced
to compete nationally with one another and with programmers. Today, Com-
cast and Cox have local cable monopolies that do not overlap.'38 In the online
space, all these distributors could compete with one another through Internet
delivery, even if Comcast does not have a cable network in a traditional Cox
market like San Diego. Programmers like the owners of Hulu also could be-
come direct competitors to Comcast and Cox. Finally, new entrant program-
mers could use the Internet to reach consumers, forcing existing programmers
to lower their prices to consumers, perhaps through fewer ads, or to provide
greater value, perhaps through innovation."'
133 Stone & Stelter, supra note 131.
134 Id.
135 See Stone, supra note 109 ("The more free Web video that makes its way to the tele-
vision, the fewer reasons people have to pay those hefty monthly bills to the cable and satel-
lite companies, which split revenue with cable networks.").
136 Stone & Stelter, supra note 131.
'37 THEODORE BOLEMA, MACKINAC CENTER FOR PUBLIC POLICY, AN EVALUATION OF
LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS FOR HIGHER CABLE FEES TO FINANCE PUBLIC, EDUCATION AND
GOVERNMENT ACCESS CHANNELS 3 (2008), http://www.mackinac.org/archives/2008/2008-
11 REGfeesWEB.pdf; Hearing Before the Subcomm. On Sci. Tech., and Space of the S.
Comm. on Commerce, Sci., and Transportation, Commercial Space Launch Industry, 105th
Cong. 8 (1998) (statement of Daniel S. Goldin, Administrator, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration).
138 Compare Comcast, Comcast Investor Relations,
http://www.cmcsk.com/our company.cfm (last visited Apr. 17, 2010) with Cox Communi-
cations, http://ww2.cox.com/(last visited Apr. 17, 2010).
139 Industry analysts looking at Hulu and other current sites warn that ad revenues from
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3. Control Over Programming and Talent
With competition from online television, MVPDs could lose some of their
market power over smaller programmers. Today, powerful "distributors have
'incredible power' over smaller programmers . . . ."1" With the ability to de-
cide whether a programmer can succeed, the distributors often pay little to
carry smaller programmers or can demand an equity stake in exchange for car-
riage.'41
A large online television market could subvert that dynamic. Programmers
could go directly to consumers without cutting a deal with the MVPD. As a
result, programmers would have greater leverage in negotiating with the
MVPD, as programmers could reach an audience without being wholly de-
pendent on a few powerful distributors. In addition, if there are more distribu-
tors to negotiate with, both online and offline, smaller programmers could ne-
gotiate for better terms with distributors.
Widespread online television also could give unions, such as screenwriters,
more bargaining power to negotiate more favorable deals with MVPD pro-
grammers. Such talent would have the option of working for more program-
mers, as smaller programmers succeed. The talent would also have the ability
to distribute content directly to consumers online, becoming programmers
themselves.
IV. EARLIER ACTIONS TO ATTACK ONLINE TELEVISION
Since the advent of high-speed Internet access service, MVPDs have used at
least three methods to stop the spread of online television. All have been fa-
mously unpopular and controversial, and they have prompted investigations,
legal action, legislation, and regulations.
A. Network Neutrality Violations
MVPDs that are also Internet access providers have targeted and blocked
online software enabling high-definition online television. As early as the
online video will never match those of broadcast and cable television, amplifying fears over
losing cable programming fees. Steve Donohue, Online Distribution Threatens TVAd Reve-
nue, CONTENTINOPLE, June 5, 2009,
http://www.contentinople.com/author.asp?section_id=603&doc-id=177656 (last visited
Apr. 16, 2010).
140 Posting of Patrick Ross, TV Everywhere and Ten Canards on Copyright, to Copyright
Alliance Blog, http://blog.copyrightalliance.org/2010/01/tv-everywhere-and-ten-canards-on-
copyright/ (Jan. 5, 2010, 13:16 EST).
141 See supra notes 56-60 and accompanying text.
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1990s, the operators made "efforts to block or otherwise impair a user's abil-
ity" to access streaming video longer than 10 minutes,'42 fearing that Internet
access would undermine MVPD revenues.'43 The CEO of AT&T Broadband
and Internet Services (then a cable operator) explained AT&T would not "al-
low others to freely transmit movies and TV shows" over AT&T's Internet
access connections because "AT&T didn't spend $56 billion to get into the
cable business 'to have the blood sucked out of our vein"' by online televi-
sion.'"
A more high-profile and recent example is Comcast's degradation of peer-
to-peer applications, such as BitTorrent, used to distribute, among other things,
high-definition online television from providers such as Vuze and Miro' 5 In
the FCC's Free Press-Comcast Order directing Comcast to stop blocking these
technologies, the Commission noted Comcast's clear anti-competitive motives:
"Peer-to-peer applications ... have become a competitive threat to cable op-
erators such as Comcast because Internet users have the opportunity to view
high-quality video with BitTorrent that they might otherwise watch (and pay
for) on cable television."'" Other carriers also engage in questionable con-
duct.'47
142 Excite@Home Keeps a Video Collar, ZDNET UK, Nov. 1, 1999,
http://news.zdnet.co.uk/hardware/0,1000000091,2074794,00.htm (noting that the other ma-
jor cable ISP-a joint venture including cable operators, called Road Runner-limited only
those streaming videos created particularly for its service).
143 Id. The article goes on to quote two industry insiders:
Part of the genesis of the ten minute restriction was from the concern that folks would
start watching streaming media on the computer instead of going to the core cable
business and watching TV shows," said Gary Arlen, a Maryland-based consultant, add-
ing that the cable companies were concerned "that video on the Net would take away
from the core business and maybe make customers not watch what the advertising sup-
ported cable programming side was offering." David Card, senior analyst for Jupiter
Communications, puts a fine edge on the reason for the restriction: "They don't want
the cable modem business to cannibalize their basic core business, which is delivering
filmed entertainment, news and sports.
Id.
144 David Lieberman, Media Giants' Net Change: Major Companies Establish Strong
Foothold Online, USA TODAY, Dec. 14, 1999, at 3B, available at LEXIS, News & Busi-
ness Library.
145 Declan McCullagh, BitTorrent Firms: Comcast Throttling is Anticompetitive, CNET
NEWS, Feb. 14, 2008, http://news.cnet.com/8301-13578_3-9872464-38.html.
146 See Free Press-Comcast Order, supra note 19, 5.
147 Cox Communications trialed a system to prioritize supposedly "time-sensitive" Inter-
net applications, excluding peer-to-peer services from its category. Todd Spangler, Cox To
Test Bandwidth-Throttling System, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, Jan. 28, 2009,
http://www.multichannel.com/article/162872-
Cox To Test BandwidthThroulingSystem.php. AT&T Wireless specifically prohibits
any P2P file sharing and redirecting television signals. Lynnette Luna, AT&T Revises Data
Usage Rules, FIERCE BROADBAND WIRELESS, May 3, 2009,
http://www.fiercebroadbandwireless.com/story/t-revises-data-usage-rules/2009-05-03.
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The distributors' "technical" defenses of these practices are questionable. In-
ternet networking experts have maintained that increases in capacity to meet
increased usage are economical."' While carriers initially claimed they could
not handle the peer-to-peer or video traffic,'49 the largest carriers are "flush
with cash, enough to upgrade and expand their broadband networks on their
own" without government subsidies. 5 ° They also now hope to carry increased
amounts of online television-their own-through an initiative called TV Eve-
rywhere, discussed below in Part IV.C.4.'5'
These network neutrality violations have resulted in thousands of consumer
complaints, several bills proposed in Congress, two FCC enforcement actions,
and an imminent FCC rulemaking.'52
AT&T Wireless has an exclusive deal with Apple for the iPhone to encourage Apple to
reject BitTorrent, SlingPlayer and other video applications. AT&T cited network burdens
and un-adjudicated copyright infringement as justifications. Posting of David Kravets, Apple
Rejects iPhone BitTorrent App, to WIRED THREAT LEVEL BLOG,
http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009/05/apple-rejects-bittorrent-iphone-app/ (May 11,
2009, 16:53 EST); Posting of Dan Moran, AT&T Defends SlingPlayer's Wi-Fi Limit, to
MACWORLD IPHONE CENTRAL,
http://www.macworld.com/article/140600/2009/05/att sling.html (May 13, 2009, 16:21).
148 Net Neutrality: Hearing before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transporta-
tion, 109th Cong. 66 (2006) (statement of Gary R. Bachula, Vice President, External Af-
fairs, Internet2). But see id. at 32 (statement of Walter McCormick Jr., President/Chief Ex-
ecutive Officer, United States Telecom Association) (emphasizing the need for economic
incentives to increase bandwidth).
149 See, e.g., In re Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry, Comments of Free
Press, WC Docket No. 07-52 (Jan. 14, 2010) at 35-37 (accessible via FCC Electronic
Comment Filing System).
150 Cecilia Kang, Major Carriers Shun Broadband Stimulus, WASH. POST, Aug. 14,
2009, at A 12.
151 See Todd Spangler, Pay TV's Internet Acid Test, MULTICHANNEL NEWS, July 6, 2009,
http://www.multichannel.com/article/307423-PayTV_s_Intenmet Acid Test.php. Time
Warner CEO Jeff Bewkes predicted that TV Everywhere would exceed the popularity of
YouTube and Hulu, proclaiming "[t]his will be by far the highest amount of online video
watched in the United States." Id. Similarly, AT&T made a deal with Major League Base-
ball ("MLB") to carry the MLB's television channel on the iPhone, providing customers
with live games streamed over the 3G network for a single $9.99 application charge. Posting
of Jordan Golson, MLB iPhone App to Live-Stream Games Over 3G; Still No Sling, to Gi-
gaOm.com, http://gigaom.com/2009/06/18/mlb-iphone-app-to-live-stream-games-over-3g-
still-no-sling/ (June 18, 2009, 12:03 PST)).
152 In re Preserving The Open Internet Broadband Industry Practices, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking FCC 09-93, GN Docket No. 09-191, WC Docket No. 07-52, at 2 (Oct. 22,
2009), http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/FCC-09-93A1.pdf. The Commis-
sion noted:
[We have] considered the issue of openness in a wide variety of contexts and proceed-
ings, including: a unanimous policy statement, a notice of inquiry on broadband indus-
try practices, public comment on several petitions for rulemaking, conditions associ-
ated with significant communications industry mergers, the rules for a major spectrum
auction, and specific enforcement actions against particular parties.
Id. See, e.g., H.R. 5273, Network Neutrality Act of 2006, 109th Cong. (2006).
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B. Targeted Cap-and-Metered Pricing
Cable and phone companies have proposed cap-and-metered pricing for In-
ternet service with details that appear to target online television.'53 Unlike the
current all-you-can-eat monthly fee-plans for Internet access, cap-and-metered
pricing would charge users based on the capacity used.'54 As a result, down-
loading or streaming large files would be more expensive than smaller files. In
March 2009, Time Warner Cable announced metered pricing trials in four cit-
ies with prices that would have made watching online television cost-
prohibitive. 5 AT&T is testing a metering plan on its wireline U-verse service
with hopes for national expansion. 6
In response to trials by Time Warner Cable, a House bill was introduced in
Congress, and Time Warner Cable dropped its immediate plans under con-
sumer pressure.' The company stated the plans would be reintroduced follow-
ing a "customer education process."'58
C. Control Over Set-Top Boxes
While many devices can put online television programming onto television
screens, the cable operators have made it nearly impossible to attach independ-
ent devices to the MVPD connection or, in doing so, to integrate online televi-
sion content and MVPD content through the same convenient interface.'59 So
"I S. DEREK TURNER, FREE PRESS, BLOCKING OR METERING: A FALSE CHOICE 1, 5
(2008).
154 Id. at 1.
155 Wendy Davis, Time Warner's Pay-Per-Download Plan Under Fire, ONLINE MEDIA
DAILY, Apr. 10, 2009,
http://www.mediapost.com/publications/?fa=Articles.showArticle&artaid=103854. Time
Warner Cable offerings started at only 5 GB for a month, with $1 charges for each GB of
overage. Id. Meanwhile, downloading a single high-definition movie often requires 3.8 GB.
See Stacey Higginbotham, The Twilight Problem: Why Metered Broadband Could Suck,
GIGAOM.COM, Apr. 14, 2009, http://gigaom.com/2009/04/14/the-metered-broadband-math-
as-much-as-2459-to-rent-twilight/.
156 John Timmer, Sorry, Beaumont! AT&T Brings (More) Bandwidth Caps to Texas, ARS
TECHNICA, Dec. 2, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2008/12/sorry-beaumont-att-
brings-bandwidth-caps-to-texas.ars. AT&T has said that their metered pricing plan "experi-
ment" ended in April 2010. See Posting of Mike Masnick, Bad Publicity, BBB Complaints
Causing A&T To Reconsider Metered Broadband? to TECHDIRT,
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20100222/1722418259.shtml (Feb. 22, 2010, 21:10 EST).
'57 See Posting of Ryan Singel, Time Warner Cable Cancels Download Cap Plans, to
WIRED EPICENTER, http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/04/time-warner-c- 1/ (Apr. 16,
2009, 11:47 EST).
158 Chloe Albanesius, Time Warner Scraps Bandwidth Cap Testing, PCMAG.coM, Apr.
16, 2009, http:/lwww.pcmag.com/article2/0,2 817,2345430,00.asp.
159 See International Comparison and Consumer Survey Requirements in the Broadband
Data Improvement Act; A National Broadband Plan for Our Future; Development of Ad-
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while you can connect an Apple TV to the Internet connection, it is very diffi-
cult to use independent devices with the cable TV connection.
Third-party makers have little to no hope of penetrating the set-top box mar-
ket for delivering MVPD programming (including video-on-demand). Cable
operators continue to actively thwart congressional and FCC efforts-two stat-
utes and several rulemakings-meant to ensure consumers can attach devices
to the network. 6 ' As a result, the set-top box is not subject to competition or
innovation (many boxes consist of very old technology), 6' and cable operators
rent boxes to users at high monthly prices.'62 As a Wired author noted, "[t]he
set-top box has proven to be a closed and well-guarded fortress against a world
of clouds and openness," and the incumbents "work strenuously to keep it that
way."'
163
The FCC has admitted that its policies have failed. In late 2009, the FCC
concluded that "set-top box market competition has not emerged, limiting in-
novation."'" In 2008, there were only "14 set-top boxes on the market, includ-
ing those leased by [MVPDs] . . . compare[d] with nearly 900 mobile de-
vanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Responsible and Timely
Fashion and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the
Telecommunications Act, Implementation of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Com-
ments of TIVO, Inc., GN Docket Nos. 09-47, 09-137, 09-80, at 4-6 (Dec. 22, 2009) [herein-
after TIVO Comments]. This process already revolutionized online music: Though few con-
sumers would have switched to the iPod from compact discs based merely on the legal digi-
tal content then available, many users moved quickly to the iPod because it permitted users
to listen also to their existing libraries. This created a larger market for digital downloads,
making a CD-free life then feasible for millions. Because of cable operator strategies, how-
ever, "Apple has largely failed to ignite the same fire in the video and TV markets as the
audio market." Cf Alex Salkever, Three Reasons Why Verizon's App Store Doesn't
Threaten Apple, DAILY FINANCE, July 15, 2009,
http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/company-news/three-reasons-why-verizons-app-store-
doesnt-threaten-apple/19098107/.
160 See Free Press MVPD Reply, supra note 39, at 6-8.
161 Saul Hansel, Like Apple, TV Explores Must-Have Applications, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7,
2009, at B1. The cable industry supplies tens of millions of consumers with "old set-top
boxes that have limited memory and processing capabilities" and the chief software archi-
tect for Comcast admits that the "lowest end set-top box [still supplied by Comcast] is the
equivalent of a Mac II from 1991." Id.
162 Cf Jacqui Cheng, Angry Customer Sues Time Warner Over Forced Cable Box
Rental, ARSTECHNICA, Aug. 14, 2008, http://arstechnica.com/gadgets/news/2008/08/angry-
customer-sues-time-wamer-over-forced-cable-box-rental.ars (last visited Apr. 14, 2010)
(reporting on a law suit alleging that, by requiring set-top box rental, a cable company
"forces the class to pay a much larger amount of money than would be the case if they were
allowed to purchase a cable box of their choice from the manufacturer of their choosing").
163 Roth, supra note 17, at 124.
164 Press Release, Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n, FCC Identifies Critical Gaps in Path to Fu-
ture Universal Broadband (Nov. 18, 2009), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs public/attachmatch/DOC-294706A I .pdf.
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vices."'65 The Consumer Electronics Association, which represents thousands
of companies, has fought for years to open up the set-top box market. As their
vice president recently summarized, "It's been a long slog .... Cable operators
have been loath to give up control."'"
Device-makers can, however, attach boxes to an Intemet connection-for
example, through an Ethernet jack.'67 This has resulted in devices like Apple
TV, Roku, Vudu, and Boxee's announced box-as well as the ability to con-
nect televisions, gaming consoles, computers, and BluRay players.
In a move that drastically reduces the consumer-friendliness of these Inter-
net-connected boxes, however the cable industry forbids outside boxes from
integrating MVPD offerings within the same interface used for navigating
Internet television. 6 Boxee's popularity rests on it being a user-friendly inter-
face that displays, in one place, television content from users' hard drives and
multiple sites across the Internet.'69 As a result of the cable industry's restric-
tions, users cannot easily "change channels" among online and MVPD pro-
grams. 1
70
While public television distributors in Europe have moved to incorporate
online and MVPD into one interface, 7' the cable industry lobbying association
in the United States has recently argued, with "Chicken Little" rhetoric, that
165 Kang, supra note 78.
166 Id.
167 In re Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996; Com-
mercial Availability of Navigation Devices, Report and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 14,775, 8
(June 11, 1998).
168 See, e.g., Memorandum of Understanding Among Cable Operators and Consumer
Electronics Adopters Regarding Interactive Digital Cable Ready Products, Apr. 25, 2008,
available at
http://fjallfoss.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf--pdf&id document-652001334
5. As one DBS operator notes, "tru2way products are forbidden by license from (1) provid-
ing any choice in user interface when accessing interactive services, and (2) including non-
MVPD programming services, such as Internet-delivered content, in the user interface that
displays the available cable programming." TIVO Comments, supra note 159, at 4.
169 See Posting of Peter Kafka, Boxee: WebTV That Makes Sense. Is That Good or Bad
for Big Cable?, to All Things Digital, http://mediamemo.allthingsd.com/20090112/boxee-
webtv-that-makes-sense-is-that-good-or-bad-for-big-cable/ (Jan. 12, 2009, 10:19 PST).
Boxee is a "New York-based start-up [that] makes elegant software that cobbles together
offerings from all of those services [Hulu and Netflix], plus many more-with whatever
media you have stored on your hard drive-and serves it up to you on your big screen, with
a minimum of fuss." Id.
170 Even the Supreme Court has noted that consumers prefer not to switch between
MVPD offerings and non-integrated offerings. Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S.
180, 219-21 (1997).
171 Posting of Brian Mahony, Comparing Hybrid OTT/Pay TV Solutions on Opposite
Sides of the Pond: TV Everywhere and Project Canvas, to Trender Research,
http://www.trenderresearch.com/profiles/blogs/comparing-hybrid-ottpay-tv (Nov. 4, 2009,
8:30 AM) ("Project Canvas [in the UK, led by BBC] is also tackling the hybrid interface
challenge head-on by providing an integrated electronic program guide ....").
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enabling integrated interfaces could result in the industry rushing to the gov-
ernment for subsidies to survive. '72
1. Content Lock-Out Tactics Against Online Television
The MVPDs are engaging in a classic content-lock-out strategy. Histori-
cally, incumbent dominant distributors of any content, for any medium, have
tried to stifle emerging competitors by denying them content, almost invariably
requiring government action to protect competition. In the first decade of the
1900s, publishers of sheet music tried to deprive manufacturers of musical
compositions for piano rolls and records;'73 and from 1914 through the 1920s,
the American Society of Composes, Authors and Publishers ("ASCAP")
brought lawsuits against broadcasters, in the attempt to limit broadcasters' ac-
cess to copyrighted content by requiring them to first obtain licenses. 7 4 In the
1970s, the incumbent television broadcasters (like NBC and CBS) tried to kill
cable operators-then new entrants-by denying access to broadcasters' tele-
vision content. "5 Without access to that incumbent content, cable operators
would have been unable to gain initial subscribers; without initial subscribers,
the cable operators would not have had the revenue and the audience to then
create their own programming content, like HBO.'76 Years later, ironically,
cable operators attempted to deny content to emerging satellite operators,' 7 so
that satellite operators could not follow the same evolution. Recently, cable
operators have deprived phone companies of premium local sports content.
178
172 See In re A National Broadband Plan For Our Future; International Comparison and
Survey Requirements in the Broadband Data Improvement Act; Inquiry Concerning the
Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in a Reasonable
and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section
706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, as Amended by the Broadband Data Improve-
ment Act; Implementation of Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 Commer-
cial Availability of Navigation Devices, Comments of the National Cable & Telecommuni-
cations Association on NBP Public Notice #27, GN Docket No. 09-51, GN Docket No. 09-
47, GN Docket No. 09-137, CS Docket No. 97-80, at 22-23 (Dec. 22, 2009) (accessible via
FCC Electronic Comment Filing System). Comparing the cable industry to the dire situation
facing newspapers "that have been disaggregated from their advertising and subscription
revenues," the NCTA claims "[i]t would make little sense to drive the industry toward that
model, at the very time that the funding of broadband deployment is recognized to be an
urgent and critical national priority." Id.
173 Timothy Wu, Copyright's Communications Policy, 103 MICH. L. REv. 278, 301
(2004).
174 Id. at 305-10.
175 Seeid. at 312-19.
176 See id. at 320-24.
177 Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the Commitment to Free, Local Television, 52 EMORY
L.J. 1579, 1690-91 (2003).
178 Kate Aishton, The Big Phone Companies' Hypocrisy, FREE PRESS, Aug. 5, 2009,
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Even AT&T, a company larger than the entire cable industry, had to file a
complaint with the FCC about access to San Diego Padres games on a Cox-
owned channel which Cox-the local cable operator-refused to license for
use on AT&T's U-verse service.'79 (Notably, Cox licensed the games to other
cable operators that did not compete directly with Cox in San Diego. 8 ) Simi-
larly, Verizon brought a complaint against Cablevision because Cablevision
denied Verizon access to the high-definition version of a Cablevision-owned
channel airing New York City professional sports. 8 '
Just as the broadcasters attempted to lock out cable operators, and as cable
operators attempted to lock out both satellite operators and phone carriers, all
three incumbent MVPD industries seek to lock out Intemet-enabled competi-
tion.
2. Content Lock-Out All Over the Internet
MVPDs apply pressure to programmers, as is well-known to industry ob-
servers. Recently, a technology journalist noted that the cable companies
could "keep pressuring their content providers-especially the good ones-to
keep as much content offline as possible."' 82 The Los Angeles Times reports
that some MVPDs "have gone so far as to stipulate that cable networks limit
the number of episodes they make available online. Others have imposed an
outright ban."'83 Executives at an unnamed major programmer confirmed that
they would not put their programming on the Internet based on the demands of
MVPDs.'84 The distributors generally threaten to pay lower per-subscriber fees
on the MVPD platform if programmers make content available online: "The
message is loud and clear to programmers," said one observer of industry pan-
http://www.freepress.net/node/71352.
179 John Eggerton, FCC Denies AT&T Program Access Complaint, BROADCASTING &
CABLE, Mar. 3, 2009, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/l89668-
FCCDenies AT T Program-Access Complaint.php.
186 Molly Peterson, FCC Rejects AT&T Program-Access Complaint Against Cox (Up-
date2), BLOOMBERG.COM, Mar. 9, 2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=alpOlawRajlc&refer=us.
181 John Eggerton, Verizon Files Program Access Complaint Against Cablevision,
BROADCASTING & CABLE, July 8, 2009, http://www.broadcastingcable.com/article/307770-
Verizon FilesProgramAccessComplaint AgainstCablevision.php.
182 Dan Frommer, Why Comcast Has To Worry About Hulu, BUSINESS INSIDER, May 4,
2009, http://www.businessinsider.com/why-comcast-has-to-worry-about-hulu-2009-5. The
L.A. Times reported that MVPDs, "[b]elieving that they should have exclusivity because
their [per-subscriber] payments support the enormous cost of producing TV shows, have
been pushing back against the Hulu freebies." Chmielewski & James, supra note 127.
183 Chmielewski & James, supra note 127.
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els at conferences. "[Y]ou'll be jeopardizing those monthly affiliate fees come
renewal time if your crown jewels leak out [onto the Internet]; worse, you'll be
subverting the entire cable business model.""8 5
Time Warner Cable has been particularly public in pressuring programmers
not to put content online. According to the New York Times, Time Warner Ca-
ble's chief executive Glenn Britt told reporters in response to a question about
making more content available online, "Guess what? We do mind."" 6 Britt
announced to content providers at the Cable Show in New Orleans that putting
shows online the same day of an MVPD broadcast "will erode your other busi-
ness model" of cable per-subscriber fees. 87 If the cable networks continue put-
ting shows online, said Britt, "we have to intervene at some point." '88 The Los
Angeles Times has also noted that Britt has repeatedly argued "that free, ad-
supported TV sites such as Hulu undermine the subscription-TV revenues that
the [content] industry depends on."'89
Time Warner Cable's chief operating officer Landel Hobbes agrees with his
boss. He said: "We have to be very careful of stuff like over the top or all
video content over the top on the Internet. There is a dual revenue stream that
we have to be careful of. Surviving on just advertising is a very tough thing."'98
These comments are focused not on survival, of course, but on preserving a
model where cable companies and programmers are overpaid and consumers
underserved. Incumbents recognize that, in a competitive world, their current
profit margins and control are not sustainable.
Time Warner Cable has also publicly engaged in hardball tactics to limit the
content its programmers made available online. In a squabble with Viacom
over online television, Time Warner Cable threatened to pull eighteen chan-
nels, including MTV, Comedy Central, and Nickelodeon, from its cable ser-
vice.' 9' Time Warner Cable's executives "put together a document outlining
185 Richmond, supra note 61.
186 Posting of Saul Hansell, The Real Fight Over Fake News, to N.Y. TIMES BITS BLOG,
http:/Ibits.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/05/29/the-real-fight-over-fake-news/ (May 29, 2008,
8:09 EST). See also Meg James, TV Viewers in Middle as Titans Clash, L.A. TIMES, Dec.
31, 2008, at C1 ("Cable operators such as Time Warner are also miffed that Viacom and
other companies have made some of their most popular programming available for free on
the Internet.").
187 Hansell, supra note 186.
188 Id
189 Posting of Jon Healey, Time Warner Cable Shows Customers How to Get TV for
Free, to L.A. TIMES TECHNOLOGY BLOG,
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/technology/2008/l1O/pc-to-tv-wamer.html (Oct. 6, 2008,
16:50 PST).
190 Steve Donohue, Time Warner Cable COO Rips 'Over-the-Top' Services, CON-
TENTINOPLE, Mar. 18, 2009,
http://www.contentinople.com/author.asp?sectionid=603&doc id= 173802.
191 Michael Learmonth & Andrew Hampp, Viacom vs. Time Warner Cable: Is Hulu to
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which shows Viacom is distributing online and where" and threatened to "start
instructing subscribers how to connect their televisions to a computer and
watch Viacom content online." '92 Viacom caved, agreeing to delay releasing
shows online in favor of Time Warner's on-demand service, and not to provide
full episodes of The Daily Show and other popular content, to benefit Time
Warner Cable's controlled video-on-demand offerings.'93 Time Warner Cable
used the same strategy last fall against LIN TV, an over-the-air broadcaster,
regarding LIN TV's online offerings.'94
Some online television distributors have already failed for lack of content.
For example, Joost was a company started by the successful founders of Skype
that raised over $50 million in capital.'95 Joost aimed to provide television pro-
gramming directly to consumers, as an online virtual MVPD provider.'96 But
after years of gaining little traction, Joost announced it would become a tech-
nology provider, rather than a competitor, to incumbent MVPDs' 97 In a de-
tailed look at the company's misfortunes, telecommunications analyst Om
Malik wrote that "[i]n the end ... it all boiled down to a lack of content."'9
Other companies, like Vuze, had cutting edge technology for delivering high-
definition television online, but lacked deals to provide much premium con-
tent, likely because of MVPD pressure."'
Netflix's ability to get valuable content is something of an exception that
proves the rule. Netflix began as a DVD service through the mail, but it always
intended to become an Internet service (hence the name Netflix, not
Blame?, ADVERTISING AGE, Dec. 31, 2008,
http://adage.com/digital/article?article-id=133543.
192 Id.
193 Merissa Marr & Nat Worden, Viacom, Time Warner Cable Reach Last-Minute Pro-
gramming Deal, WALL ST. J., Jan. 2, 2009, at A11; Posting of Mike Masnick, Viacom, Time
Warner Cable Fight Over Cost of Comedy Central, MTV, to TECHDIRT,
http://www.techdirt.com/articles20081231/1129493264.shtml (Dec. 31, 2008, 13:19 EST).
194 Healey, supra note 189.
195 Rafat Ali, Joost Finally Acquired, By Online Ad Network Adconion, PaidContent.org,
Nov. 24, 2009, http://paidcontent.org/article/419-joost-finally-acquired-by-online-ad-
network-adconion/.
196 Jacqui Cheng, Joost Finally Sheds Invite-Only Status, Opens Up to the Public, ARS
TECHNICA, Oct. 1, 2007, http://arstechnica.com/old/content/2007/10/joost-finally-sheds-
invite-only-status-opens-up-to-the-public.ars.
197 Scott Morrison, Joost Names New CEO in Shift, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2009, at B7.
198 Posting of Om Malik, What Went Wrong With Joost?, to GigaOm.com,
http://gigaom.com/2009/06/30/what-went-wrong-with-joost/ (June 30, 2009, 10:30 PM
PST).
199 See Posting of Cecilia Kang, Vuze CEO on TV Everywhere, Competition (Uh, or Lack
Thereof), to WASH. POST POST TECH,
http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2009/10/vuze ceo talks tv everywhere v.html
(Oct. 20, 209, 08:00 AM ET).
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Postalflix).2 ° To get valuable content, Netflix found a "loophole" in contracts,
realizing that premium channels like Starz could sell rights to Netflix. 2 °' This
window may not stay open long if "[u]nhappy studios or cable companies...
renegotiate their contract with Starz to discourage it from working with Net-
flix., 202
3. Content-Lock-Out for Big Screens
MVPDs also work to keep Internet-TV content off television screens and
solely on laptop screens. Perhaps the most high-profile scuffle in the entire
online television space was between Hulu and Boxee.2 13 As discussed above,
Boxee offers software that allows users to aggregate content from services like
Hulu and Netflix, with the media on users' hard drives, and to stream that con-
tent to their televisions.2 ° Of course, some users have inevitably come to view
the service as a potential alternative to cable or satellite service." 5 And Hulu's
partners-perhaps under pressure from MVPDs like Comcast-were con-
cerned enough about Boxee to block its use.0 6
Boxee has observed the pressure on programmers. Speaking on a panel in
New York, Boxee CEO Avner Ronen explained:
At the beginning, [the cable companies] didn't care, because we didn't have users, we
didn't have money, we didn't have a product, so everybody was very nice to us. And
then, when we launched it, they were also nice to us. But then we opened up our al-
pha in January 2009, and, in February, we got the call saying, "You're on the front
business section of the New York Times, and there was a big TV with Boxee on it,
and the logo of Hulu, and other services." And then the cable companies started to
say, "what's going on, we're paying 20 billion dollars a year for licenses to content,
and you're putting them online for free" ... apparently what we weren't politically
savvy enough to understand is, if you watch a video on a 15-inch screen, it's one
thing, if you project that video on a 32-inch screen, then people freak out.
20 7
The reason for the increased freak-out is evident on reflection-the cable
operators and other MVPDs have dominated the living room television screen.
They can exact two subscription fees, one for video and one for broadband, as
a result. If consumers can watch high-definition, long-form programming on
their television screens through competitors delivering over the Internet, then
200 Roth, supra note 17, at 122.
201 Id. at 142 ("'We looked at our contract rights and saw that they [Netflix] were an
aggregator of content just like the other distributors,' said Starz CEO Robert Clasen.").
202 Id.
203 Foresman, supra note 5.
204 Kafka, supra note 169.
205 Stone, supra note 109.
206 Kilar, supra note 6.
207 The Open Video Alliance, Industry Perspectives on Open Video, June 29, 2009,




MVPDs have to face increased competition. Boxee's Ronen recalls: "We actu-
ally sat in a room with executives from a big media company, and they asked
us, 'Can we detect the size of the monitor the users are watching the video on?'
... I assume the next question would have been, 'So can you block it [on large
screens]?"'208
All these reports suggest that MVPDs, notably cable operators, have applied
considerable pressure on content programmers to keep content offline, and
then to ensure that whatever content is online is unavailable on television
screens.
4. TV Everywhere
In 2009, incumbent MVPDs reached agreements to counter the threat of on-
line television. The heart of the agreement-which consumer groups allege to
be illegal collusion2°9-was requiring popular programmers like TBS, CBS,
TNT, and Discovery, to make their content available online to a subscriber
only if the subscriber was "authenticated" as a cable subscriber as well as an
Internet subscriber. 2"° This tied the availability of online content to a cable sub-
scription. This tie makes it very difficult for a competing virtual MVPD to of-
fer a subscription including such programming, since consumers must also pay
the virtual MVPDs' competitors-the incumbent MVPDs-to have access to
the content online. Comcast and Time Warner jointly published the "princi-
ples" of TV Everywhere, which maintain these deals are "open and non-
exclusive,"2 because, "cable, satellite or telco video distributors can enter into
similar agreements with other programmers."22 Excluded from the list, of
course, are virtual MVPDs, the disruptive innovators and potential competi-
tors. Indeed, the whole goal of TV Everywhere is to undermine the emergence
of strong virtual MVPDs. While the traditional MVPDs will make content
available online subject to traditional subscriptions, the virtual MVPDs will
deliberately remain excluded as the target of the incumbents' apparent collu-
sion.
208 Id.
209 Cecilia Kang, Public Interest Groups Call for Antitrust Probe of TV Everywhere,
WASH. POST, Jan. 4, 2010, at A9.
210 Cable TVFollows Its Subscribers to the Internet, supra note 125.
211 Press Release, Time Warner Inc., Time Warner Inc. Announces Widespread Distribu-
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V. POLICY SOLUTIONS TO CONTENT-LOCK-OUT FOR ONLINE
VIDEO
Congress or the FCC should address the content-lock-out strategy to unlock
competition in the video market, saving Americans billions of dollars a year
and providing additional value and choice. I propose, in this paper, one pri-
mary policy solution: a compulsory license, common in the history of commu-
nications law's brush with content-lock-out of new entrants.
A. Extending Existing Rules is Not Enough
Some existing rules aim to benefit competing MVPDs, but would likely do
little for virtual MVPDs. The existing rules derive from communications laws
generally incorporated in the Communications Act of 1934, as amended sev-
eral times, notably with two cable-focused acts in 1984 and 1992."3
For example, Congress directed the FCC to implement rules "governing
program carriage agreements and related practices between cable operators or
other multichannel video programming distributors and video programming
vendors."2 '4 The FCC was to ban "a cable operator or other multichannel video
programming distributor from coercing" a programmer to provide "exclusive
rights against other multichannel video programming distributors as a condi-
tion of carriage on a system. 21 5 Congress also directed the FCC to ban retalia-
tion against a programmer for refusing to provide exclusive rights.2 6
These provisions, however, may not necessarily help virtual MVPDs subject
to content-lock-out, because the FCC defines "coercing" on a context-specific
basis requiring a detailed examination of facts (resulting in a costly, time-
consuming complaint process with little predictability for a complainant),2 7
and cases would be unlikely because even powerful programmers are afraid of
retaliation for approaching the FCC over such matters.1 8 In addition, discour-
213 See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No.
102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C. (2006)); Cable Com-
munications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified in scattered
sections of 47 U.S.C.).
214 47 U.S.C. § 536(a) (2006).
215 § 536(a)(2).
216 Id.
217 See In re Implementation Of Sections 12 And 19 Of The Cable Television Consumer
Protection And Competition Act Of 1992 Development Of Competition And Diversity In
Video Programming Distribution And Carriage, Second Report and Order, 9 F.C.C.R 2642,
2648, 14 (Sept. 23, 1993).
218 In re Implementation of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992, Development of Competition and Diversity in Video Programming Distribu-
tion and Carriage, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 4415, 11 (1994) ("[T]he
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aging distribution by virtual MVPDs is not necessarily covered by the lan-
guage of an "exclusive" right, as other MVPDs could have access to the con-
tent," 9 and the definition of MVPD in the Communications Act does not
clearly cover virtual MVPDs 2 °
Beyond this narrow prohibition on "coercing," Congress directed the FCC to
adopt rules
designed to prevent a multichannel video programming distributor from engaging in
conduct the effect of which is to unreasonably restrain the ability of an unaffiliated
video programming vendor to compete fairly by discriminating in video programming
distribution on the basis of affiliation or nonaffiliation of vendors in the selection,
terms, or conditions.
22'
This rule prohibiting discrimination against rival MVPDs through controlling
affiliated content would not do enough for virtual MVPDs The incumbents
could run up a startup virtual MVPDs' legal fees, deprive the MVPDs of con-
tent for months or years of negotiation while claiming to be nondiscriminatory
until a complaint is filed and a long administrative case results. In addition,
many programmers are not vertically integrated with a cable operator, yet still
deny content to virtual MVPDs, likely because of cable operator demands.
Therefore, even if the rule were effective, it would only cover a subset of
locked-out content. Finally, AT&T is currently arguing that the cable operators
are attempting to avoid this rule for popular sports programming through
"loopholes," so virtual MVPDs may be harmed by similar loopholes.2
Moreover, there is little reason to think the FCC will rush to the aid of en-
trants (or consumers). The FCC is a famously captured agency--captured by
the industries it is supposed to regulate, like the phone, cable, and broadcast
industries.23 The FCC has failed to implement effective rules promoting com-
petition in the cable industry at any level despite congressional directives: the
Chairman of Viacom International, Inc., ('Viacom') testified before the Senate Subcommit-
tee on Antitrust, Monopolies, and Business Rights that Viacom has not complained of al-
leged anticompetitive abuses by TCI because of its fear of retaliation .... ).
219 Cf 47 U.S.C. § 536(a)(2); 47 C.F.R. § 76.1301(b) ("No cable operator or other
[MVPD] shall coerce any video programming vendor to provide, or retaliate against such a
vendor for failure to provide, exclusive rights against any other multichannel video pro-
gramming distributor as a condition for carriage on a system.").
220 47 U.S.C. §522(13).
221 47 U.S.C. § 536 (a)(3).
222 Joelle Tessler, FCC Seeking to Close Programming Access Loophole, AB-
CNEws.coM, Dc. 15, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/Sports/wireStory?id=9343830.
223 See Kevin Ryan, Comment, Communications Regulations - Ripe for Reform, 17
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 771, 804 (2009). See also Reed Hundt, Chairman, Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n, Speech to Center for National Policy (May 6, 1996),
http://www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Hundt/spreh624.txt. The then-FCC Chairman noted that past
Commission practices had led some to joke that the FCC "had come to stand for Firmly
Captured by Corporations." Id.
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Commission has caved to the cable industry on leased access,"' on set-top
boxes,22 on program access, 2' and even on Internet access.221 In the past, in-
cumbents have used the FCC to suppress competition from new entrants by
imposing regulations on them, turning the purpose of many pro-competition
statutory provisions on their head.228 If the virtual MVPDs must rely on a regu-
latory structure, this requires the FCC to define "coercion," to judge whether
incumbent MVPDs are nondiscriminatory in their dealings over affiliated pro-
gramming, and to provide swift justice, the virtual MVPDs would be doomed.
B. Compulsory Licensing
A compulsory license, if properly crafted, is likely the best solution to the
content-lock-out strategies of incumbent MVPDs. Regulators ranging from
Congress to antitrust courts have applied the familiar remedy of compulsory
licenses where incumbents use copyright denial strategies to kill entrant com-
petitors. A compulsory license requires copyright holders to license their con-
tent to anyone wishing to use it and sets a maximum price.229 This license thus
ensures access to content and parity among content distributors, ending anti-
competitive content-lock-out by incumbents denying content to rival distribu-
tors.23° It also ensures copyright-holders are compensated for their works.
Compulsory licenses are common in the history of communications law and
could serve the goals of copyright and communications policy here.
C. Copyright, Innovation, and Competition Among Distributors
The copyright laws aim to incentivize innovation, and are crafted by Con-
gress to further that end. 23 ' The copyright laws are what provide programmers
the ability to profit from their creations-they can demand payment for copies
of their work and seek injunctions and damages from those making unauthor-
224 See Eggerton, supra note 87.
225 See Anderson, supra note 89.
226 See Tessler, supra note 222.
227 See Nat'l Cable & Telecomm. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Serv., 545 U.S. 967, 968
(2005) ("[T]he Commission classified broadband cable modem service as an 'information
service' but not a 'telecommunications service' under the 1996 Act, so that it is not subject
to mandatory Title II common-carrier regulation.").
228 John Blevins, Death of the Revolution: The Legal War on Competitive Broadband
Technologies, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 85, 134-38 (2009) (noting how incumbents have
proven successful in using both regulatory and deregulatory policies to harm entrants).
229 Alan M. Fisch, Compulsory Licesning of Blacked-Out Professional Team Sporting
Event Telecasts (PTSETS): Using Copyright Law to Mitigate Monopolistic Behavior, 32
HARv. J. ON LEGIs. 403, 410 (1995).
230 Cf Wu, supra note 173, at 325-29.
231 See Feist Publ'ns, Inc., v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 359-60 (1991).
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ized copies.232 While we usually assume copyright-holders are under no obliga-
tion to let others make copies of their work, copyright policy provides numer-
ous exceptions to that rule. 33 To promote innovation (as well as democratic
speech),"' the Copyright Act has major well-known exceptions including the
contours of copyright (public domain works and the non-protection of ideas
being notable),235 fair use defenses to copying,"' and numerous compulsory
licenses. 7 The law's choice of exclusive rights, liability rules, privileges, and
no-rights have produced volumes of excellent academic analysis on the rela-
tionship between the right of exclusion and copyright's ability to promote in-
novation and competition. 38 In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grok-
ster, Ltd., dueling concurrences by Justice Stephen Breyer and Justice Ruth
Bader Ginsburg turned on whether exclusive rights would promote or under-
mine innovation, and what the extent of those effects might be.239 On one
hand, exclusive-rights maximalists (who favor Ginsburg) argue that innovation
is best-served by strong, clear exclusive rights-rights-holders are in the best
position to determine how to market and license their rights, and the result of
these rights-holders making informed decisions based on their self-interest
should naturally lead to the greatest innovation. 4 °
On the other hand, exclusive-rights maximization could undermine new
technologies, notably new distributors of content. In Grokster itself, incumbent
distributors of music-the large record distributors-attempted to shut down
peer-to-peer technologies. 4 ' While Justice Breyer agreed that the particular
technology in question had violated the copyright laws because the company
actively encouraged copyright violations, he was solicitous of banning an en-
tire technology just because some could use that technology to violate copy-
right law.242 Grokster itself rested on the Sony case that determined the VCR
was not an illegal device just because most Americans may have used it to
make unauthorized, infringing, copies. 43 In that case, too, incumbent distribu-
232 See 17 U.S.C. §§ 502, 504 (2006).
233 See, e.g., id § 107.
234 See Marvin Ammori, Beyond Content Neutrality: Understanding Content-Based
Promotion of Democratic Speech, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 273, 287 (2009).
235 17 U.S.C. § 102(b); JAMES BOYLE, THE PUBLIC DOMAIN 38 (2008).
236 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006).
237 Id. § 115.
238 See, e.g., Henry E. Smith, Intellectual Property as Property: Delineating Entitlements
in Information, 116 YALE L. J. 1742 (2007).
239 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 941-67 (2005).
240 Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON.
265, 275-80 (1977).
241 Grokster, 545 U.S. at919-21.
242 Id. at 949-61.
243 Id. at 931-37; Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456
(1984).
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tors of programming-therefore broadcasters-sought to control a new distri-
bution medium, one that was eventually deemed a complement to broadcast-
ing.
44
With online video distribution, the question is not necessarily one regarding
infringement-companies like Apple and Vuze have not engaged in infringe-
ment, they are merely seeking the licenses to distribute content legally. Yet, the
debate over copyright and new distribution technologies here is similar to the
discussion in the Grokster concurrences. Some academics have argued that the
current contours of copyright law may undermine new distribution technolo-
gies by permitting old media giants to weaken the ability of new technologies
(and new creations) to enter the market."5 They argue that a more "balanced"
approach would still incentivize copyrighted works while ensuring fair use and
innovation in content and technologies.
2 46
Some authors argue that a compulsory licensing system often strikes an ap-
propriate balance between the concerns noted above. 47 Unlike the property
rights-like exclusive rights, or the "privileges" of finding no infringement at
all, compulsory licenses are "liability rules," permitting others to use the copy-
right subject to a fee.2 48 A compulsory license can strike that balance because it
ensures a copyright-right holder is compensated, and therefore incentivizes the
creation of valuable content and rewards the creators. At the same time, it re-
moves the possibility of strategic anticompetitive behavior by incumbent dis-
tributors.
While these arguments are made in the abstract, in network communica-
tions, the government has intervened repeatedly to ensure competition among
rival distributors. 249 Tim Wu has published a seminal article on the relationship
between copyright and communications law, observing that much of the Copy-
right Act is devoted to complex, arcane compulsory licensing regimes and im-
munities arbitrating disputes (or enacting settlements) of rivaling industries. 5 °
These licenses impact much of the media consumed by Americans and include
244 464 U.S. at 421 (explaining how the practice of "time-shifting" actually enlarges the
broadcast audience).
245 See, LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 145-46 (2001).
246 YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKs 37-41 (2006).
247 See WILLIAM W. FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP 41, 144-45 (2004).
248 Cf Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1092-93 (1972).
249 See, e.g., In re Exclusive Service Contracts for Provision of Video Services in Multi-
ple Dwelling Units and Other Real Estate Developments, Report and Order and Further
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 22 F.C.C.R. 20,235, 1 (Oct. 31, 2007) ("[I]n this Order
we prohibit the enforcement of existing exclusivity clauses and the execution of new ones
by cable operators and others subject to the relevant statutory provisions. This prohibition
will materially advance the Act's goals of enhancing competition and broadband employ-
ment.").
250 See generally Wu, supra note 173.
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compulsory licenses for: secondary transmissions of broadcast signals by cable
operators and others, webcasting by Internet radio stations, public broadcasting
of non-dramatic musical works, and pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works,
and also the satellite retransmission of broadcast signals. 5 '
Copyright-holders simply cannot engage in content lock-out if they must li-
cense their content, especially if the compulsory rate is reasonable for new en-
trants. In addition, compulsory licenses reduce transaction costs surrounding
the identification of and negotiation for copyrighted materials, therefore reduc-
ing entry costs for new entrants.' In many industries today, a compulsory li-
cense is an accepted part of business.25'
Despite arguments to eliminate existing compulsory licenses, the market for
Internet television is precisely the kind where consumers would benefit from a
compulsory license. Recently, the Copyright Office has proposed eliminating
certain compulsory licenses, including the licenses for satellite and cable re-
transmissions of broadcast signals." 4 The argument against compulsory li-
censes usually rests on assumptions of efficient bargaining. That is, one as-
sumes that any distributor-incumbent or entrant---can negotiate with copy-
right-holders for access to copyrighted works. The negotiated terms of this
transaction would reflect how much each party values the copyrighted work,
and would do so better than any government-set price like a compulsory li-
cense.
Moreover, one assumes that the transaction costs (of discovering the rights-
holders and negotiating rights) are low and that strategic behavior is unlikely.
Or, at the least, one assumes that, despite transactional costs and strategic be-
havior, such negotiations are more likely to maximize efficiency of allocation
than government interventions like compulsory licenses.25'
These assumptions argue for "property rules" rather than "liability rules."
These assumptions of relatively low transactional costs and unlikely strategic
behavior also pervade arguments in communications policy for strong property
rights in networks (rather than compulsory leasing, or "open access" or "un-
bundling") and for property rights in spectrum (rather than unlicensed or
251 See id. at 290.
252 See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Creation and Commercial Value: Copyright Protection of
Works of Information, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 1865, 1925 (1990) ("The most popular current
justification for compulsory licensing is the reduction of otherwise insuperable transactions
costs.").
253 See DONALD PASSMAN, ALL You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT THE Music BUSINESS 207-
210 (6th Ed. 2008).
254 Copyright Office, SATELLITE HOME VIEWER EXTENSION AND REAUTHORIZATION ACT
SECTION 109 REPORT 219-223 (June 2008).
255 See Robert P. Merges, Of Property Rules, Coase, and Intellectual Property, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2655, 2668-69 (1994).
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shared access).256 Despite the Copyright Office's conclusion, these assumptions
are likely wrong for Internet TV. Transactions costs appear extremely high, as
entrants must negotiate with numerous copyright holders to secure all the nec-
essary rights to offer virtual MVPDs. (This is why Congress adopted the origi-
nal compulsory licenses for cable and satellite, regarding broadcast alone)." 7
Not only are transaction costs high, strategic behavior is evident. Namely,
copyright-holders are subject to the pressure of MVPDs acting strategically to
deny their potential Internet-based competition of a key input (content) neces-
sary to compete. As a result, there is little reason to believe the existing mar-
ket-granting a property-rule right to copyright-right holders vis a vis online
television-leads to efficient allocation. Indeed, in comparing this "market"
solution to government "intervention" through a compulsory license, govern-
ment intervention could lead to greater efficiency. (Of course, both are forms
of government intervention; one form is a government-conferred property-rule
right backed by the power of the state, the other is a government-conferred
liability rule backed by the power of the state.). 8 A compulsory license could
be structured to lower transaction costs for new entrants and society as a
whole. With one central clearinghouse for such rights and with set rates, en-
trants could easily find the party with whom to "negotiate" or pay (the Copy-
right Office) and easily determine the price.
The transaction costs borne by government to implement this system are
likely lower than the "market" costs of today's system, as the government
would benefit from economies of scale in clearing all rights, while each video
entrant would not have such economies. Of course, government could poorly
craft the compulsory license, in a way leading to even less allocational effi-
ciency, if the license is so complex or fragmented that transactions costs re-
main high. But the history of compulsory licenses shows that they often do
work far better than enabling incumbent distributors to deny content needed by
new distributors. And government can follow certain principles to ensure the
compulsory license fulfils the goals of the license-and a key goal of copyright
policy-ensuring creation and wide dissemination of creative works, while
ensuring innovation in distribution technologies.
D. Models for the Compulsory License
Compulsory licenses are common remedies where an incumbent distributor
256 See, e.g., FED. COMMC'NS COMM'N, SPECTRUM POLICY TASK FORCE REPORT, at 38-39
(2002), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-228542A 1 .pdf.
257 See In re Section 109 Report to Congress, Comments of EchoStar Satellite L.L.C.,
U.S. Copyright Office Docket No. 2007-1, at 6-8 (July 2, 2007).
258 See Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State,
38 POL. ScI. Q. 470-478 (1923).
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is denying content to an entrant distributor to destroy competition. Existing
compulsory licenses can provide models for the license necessary here.
The most famous compulsory license may involve the composition license
for music. Recorded music is covered by two copyrights--one for the underly-
ing composition (which also gives rights over a "cover" of song) and one for
the recorded performance (giving rights for publicly airing or performing a
song). 59 The first is subject to a compulsory license set by Congress; the sec-
ond is subject, effectively, to a compulsory license overseen by the courts,
based on an antitrust law settlement.2" In the first decade of the 20th century,
manufacturers of piano rolls26' and early record players were able to buy one
copy of sheet music, and then to mass-produce piano-rolls or records based on
that one purchase.262 Publishers of sheet music-then the incumbent distribu-
tors-accused the early music industry of piracy, as their copyrights underlie
the piano rolls and records. 63 When the courts read copyright narrowly, permit-
ted the existing "piracy," and refused to find the new industry liable, Congress
passed a compulsory license scheme in 1909.64 Under that license, "[s]o long
as the composer agreed or knowingly acquiesced to an initial recording ...
anyone willing to pay the statutory fee would then be entitled to use any copy-
righted composition to record his own version of the song. ' In this way, the
incumbent distributors of copyrighted works were compensated, but could not
lock content out of the hands of new distributors.
The music performance royalty has a different history, but a similar resolu-
tion. In the 1930s to 1950s, song-performers-the original "distributors" of
music performances-sought to undermine the new distributors of over-the-air
radio.266 These attempts eventually resulted in the settlement of an antitrust
case brought by the Department of Justice.267 That settlement effectively im-
posed a compulsory license for performance royalties.266 The Department of
Justice required licensing to all parties and mandated court arbitration of con-
flicts over rates, but did not set rates itself.269 To this day, song compositions
259 Brian R. Day, Collective Management of Music Copyright in the Digital Age: The
Online Clearinghouse, 18 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 195, 199-200 (2010).
260 Cf Wu, supra note 173, at 301-10.
261 A piano roll is a roll of paper with holes punched in it determining the note played on
a "self-playing" piano. AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, THE ART OF Music LICENSING 308 (1992).
262 See Wu, supra note 173, at 300-01; White-Smith Music Publ'g Co. v. Apollo Co.,
209 U.S. 1, 11-18 (1908).
263 See Wu, supra note 173, at 297-301.
264 Copyright Act of 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-349, 35 Stat. 1075 (repealed 1976); see Wu,
supra note 173, at 301-03.
265 Wu, supra note 173, at 303.
266 Id. at 307-10.
267 Id. at 305-10.
268 Id. at 310.
269 Id. at 310--11.
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are governed by this effective compulsory license.
Similarly, the remedy imposed by the Supreme Court in the Associated
Press antitrust case acted effectively as a compulsory license. In that case, the
Associated Press shared its "must-have" news-wire content only with newspa-
pers that were members of the Associated Press.27 ° It denied content to non-
members, and permitted any incumbent member to deny content (and member-
ship) to new distributing newspapers, crippling those new distributors for lack
of content.27' The Court approved a remedy "to mean that AP news is to be
furnished to competitors of old members without discrimination through By-
Laws controlling membership, or otherwise." ' A requirement to furnish with-
out discrimination, subject to court oversight, effectively serves as a compul-
sory license.
Later, in the 1970s, the incumbent broadcast television providers, such as
those affiliated with CBS, NBC, and ABC, tried to kill cable operators then a
new entrant by denying access to broadcast television content.273 While the
Supreme Court initially granted the cable operators immunity from copyright
infringement for retransmitting any broadcast signal,274 the eventual settlement
to the broadcasters' efforts was, once again, a compulsory license.
Years later, Congress enacted a compulsory license for satellite operators to
carry local broadcast stations, under some circumstances, on a royalty-free ba-
sis.176 This license is intended partly to "promote competition between satellite
carriers and cable operators by permitting a parallel array of local program-
ming, 77 thus protecting satellite entrants.
More recently, online radio is subject to a compulsory license, albeit to one
with several complexities and issues.2 78 Administrative modifications in the
royalty rates for the license resulted in litigation, legislation, and intense lobby-
ing on both sides, as online radio distributors argued that high rates would put
many of them out of business.279
270 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 3-5 (1945).
271 See id. at 4-5.
272 Id. at 21.
273 Cf Lateef Mtima, Copyright Social Utility and Social Justice Interdependence: A
Paradigm for Intellectual Property Empowerment and Digital Entrepeneurship, 112 W. VA.
L. REV. 97, 116 n. 43 (2009).
274 See Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390, 400-02
(1968); Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broad. Sys. Inc., 415 US 394, 412-14 (1974).
275 Wu, supra note 173, at 320-23.
276 See The Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-667, tit. 2, 102 Stat.
3935, 3949.
277 U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE, SATELLITE HOME VIEWER EXTENSION AND REAUTHORIZA-
TION ACT SECTION 109 REPORT ii (2008).
278 See WILLIAM W. FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP 104-109 (2004).
279 Amy Duvall, Note, Royalty Rate-Setting for Webcasters: A Royal(ty) Mess, 15 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REv. 267, 268-87 (2008).
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E. Specifying a Compulsory License
Congress, or (if relevant) an antitrust court, should adopt a compulsory li-
cense to ensure copyright-holders are compensated and ensure that incumbent
distributors cannot ensure content-lock-out of new competitors. With a com-
pulsory license, as the online radio license demonstrates, the devil is in the de-
tails, and the details are somewhat difficult to get right.
A few principles should guide the specification of an online television li-
cense. First, because setting the details is difficult, a license could be subject to
a "sunset" or price re-adjustment after a period of several years or once a cer-
tain percentage of consumers have subscribed to any virtual MVPD. After sev-
eral years with virtual MVPDs, virtual MVPDs could possibly have enough
bargaining power to negotiate for programming despite the incumbents' con-
tent-lock-out, as consumers could get accustomed to online video competition
and these virtual MVPDs would have consumers, brand recognition, and a
supporting business ecosystem. Without a sunset today, the license could con-
tinue based on inertia.
Second, the compulsory license must involve very low transaction-costs.
New entrants should be able to focus on building a business and a technology,
rather than investing in lawyers to handle a complex license. As a result, the
fees should be clearly defined for streaming content, downloads, on-demand,
and even scheduled content. There should be a catchall rate, should new, inter-
active firms of streaming or downloading emerge.
Third, the pricing mechanism should encourage use while benefiting copy-
right holders. The mechanism should be tied to popularity, and be reasonable
and nondiscriminatory, and distributed by bodies already tasked with disburs-
ing similar fees. Yet, setting the exact price is not easy, and that price has an
enormous impact on business models and competition, as the battles over the
online radio license signify. Rather than rely on a government equation or rate
setting, market-like mechanisms-much like those used by Google to sell ad-
vertising28 -- could better determine the fee. For example, a real-time auction
could set the prices. An auction would ensure that the fee is not too high for
market participants to use, nor so low that the fee is unfair.
Setting up a proper auction also would be complicated, but likely less com-
plicated than setting prices in the absence of such a mechanism. With new
technologies, the auctions could take place instantaneously and digitally. Vir-
tual MVPDs would have to bid on a finite, scarce number of impressions; if
every MVPD had access to an impression the price would be driven to zero. So
280 See Posting of Austin Rachlin, Introduction to the Ad Auction, to Inside AdWords,
http://adwords.blogspot.com/2009/03/introduction-to-ad-auction.html (Mar. 12, 2009, 1:40
EST).
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virtual MVPDs could bid on a total number of impressions, capped at a total
number of impressions for the Internet market--equal to, say, twenty percent
or thirty percent of the population the first week of a program and then fewer
over the next weeks. (Anything beyond that number of impressions would be
subject to negotiation, not a compulsory license).
At first, even with a cap of twenty percent, the number of impressions avail-
able may be so high relative to the market that the bids would be low. The low
bids would entice competitors and encourage these competitors to seek con-
sumers rapidly. Eventually, as these competitors attract larger audiences and
more viewers, then the price will be bid up and copyright-holders would re-
ceive a correspondingly increased share of the increased value.28" ' Of course,
setting these numbers would be difficult as well, but the auction mechanism
should help ensure, at the least, that the mechanism is useful, rather than too
high for use, or so low as to under-incentivize creation of popular content. As
the government has implemented successful compulsory licenses throughout
history, and can tweak the rules, the govemment can possibly set the incentives
better through a compulsory license than the current incentive structure-
which has resulted in content-lock-out.
F. Support for a Compulsory License
If properly structured, many stakeholders would support this compulsory li-
cense. For smaller programmers, the license would ensure that they garner
revenues from new distributors without retribution from cable operators or
others. Furthermore, the advent of legal online distribution would likely curtail
current piracy, as it did in the online music market, also benefiting program-
mers. For smaller MVPDs, who now fear discrimination in the terms and con-
ditions of accessing content, a nondiscriminatory compulsory license would
permit small distributors to pay the same fees as their largest competitors for
online television. In addition, independent studios would have a level playing
field with third-party online television distributors otherwise, distributors may
need to make concessions to the largest programmers, such as buying or high-
lighting those programmers' least popular content at the expense of independ-
ent studios' programming. Plus independent studios would benefit from a
competitive online television space, which would likely curtail piracy in their
works. Finally, virtual MVPDs should certainly support a compulsory license,
which would permit them to distribute the premium content now denied them
281 Possibly, to ensure one virtual MVPD-such as Apple--does not bid the price be-
yond other virtual MVPDs and become the sole virtual MVPD making use of the license,
any one virtual MVPD could be limited to no more than fifty percent (or thirty percent, etc.)
of the auctioned impressions.
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by the content-lock-out. These MVPDs would provide innovation, and likely
drive lower prices and greater choice in television content-from sitcoms to
news-for all Americans.
VI. CONCLUSION
Online television is this nation's best shot at undermining the MVPD indus-
try oligopolies and cartels. Permitting online distributors to compete vigor-
ously on the merits, for computer screens and television screens, is only possi-
ble if government responds to current content lock-out tactics by incumbents.
The usual, and appropriate, remedy here is a compulsory license. The market
resulting from such a license would improve American's lives both as consum-
ers of content and informed participants in our democracy.
